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Differentiated infrastructure charging: a comparison of theory and practise

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  • Knockaert, Jasper
  • Evangelinos, Christos
  • Rietveld, Piet
  • Wieland, Bernhard

Abstract

In the European Union, the infrastructure charging regimes that can be observed are often far from internalising external costs and are rarely based on efficiency principles. In this situation differentiation of existing charges appears to be a sensible intermediate step. In this paper we study the empirical evidence of the different aspects that affect infrastructure pricing as described by theory. In order to do so information was collected from a number of case studies, and a set of indicators was defined, not only to allow for the analysis of price differentiation practise with respect to the degree of differentiation, but also to account for the level of ambition of the price setting actors. The cross-case analysis was based on a number of hypotheses that were drawn from the theoretical framework. Testing for the hypotheses using the case study information allowed us to establish an overview of the current state of differentiated infrastructure charging.

Suggested Citation

  • Knockaert, Jasper & Evangelinos, Christos & Rietveld, Piet & Wieland, Bernhard, 2009. "Differentiated infrastructure charging: a comparison of theory and practise," European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, ISTIEE, Institute for the Study of Transport within the European Economic Integration, issue 43, pages 4-34.
    • Handle: RePEc:sot:journl:y:2009:i:43:p:4-34
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/6133
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    Cited by:

    1. Evangelinos, Christos, 2013. "Interessengruppen und Preissetzung im Verkehr," Discussion Papers 2/2013, Technische Universität Dresden, "Friedrich List" Faculty of Transport and Traffic Sciences, Institute of Transport and Economics.
    2. Evangelinos, Christos & Püschel, Ronny & Goldhahn, Susan, 2011. "Inverting the regulatory rules? Optimizing airport regulation to account for commercial revenues," Discussion Papers 1/2011, Technische Universität Dresden, "Friedrich List" Faculty of Transport and Traffic Sciences, Institute of Transport and Economics.
    3. Evangelinos, Christos & Püschel, Ronny & Niemeier, Hans-Martin, 2020. "Special interest groups and price-structure: An application to noise charging at Zurich Airport," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).

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