IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/ecstat/estat_0336-1454_2001_num_343_1_7457.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

L'effet de l'allocation unique dégressive sur la reprise d'emploi

Author

Listed:
  • Brigitte Dormont
  • Denis Fougère
  • Ana Prieto

Abstract

[eng] The effect of the unemployment benefits time curve on the rate of return to work by job seekers is studied based on a comparison of two successive regulations. The rules in force from 1986 to 1992, before the introduction of the Single Degressive Benefit (SDB), provided for a single drop in the level of benefits. The SDB introduced in 1992, however, provides for steady decreases in benefits. . The duration model estimates show that, under the pre-1992 system, the return-to-work rate rose sharply towards the end of the full-rate benefits period. This finding holds mainly for the job seekers with the highest past wages. The introduction of the SDB levelled off the return-to-work rate time curve. The estimated highly significant deviation between the probabilities of remaining unemployed under the old and new system is only partly ascribable to macroeconomic variations. There remains a difference that can be explained by the change in benefits time curves. In other words, the type of degression implemented from 1992 to 1996 probably slowed down the return to work. [fre] Le profil de l’indemnisation du chômage influence-t-il la reprise d’emploi? Cette question est étudiée en comparant deux réglementations successives de l’assurance chômage. La réglementation en vigueur de 1986 à 1992 prévoit un profil simple en deux paliers: l’indemnisation connaît une seule chute, plus ou moins forte, lors du passage de l’allocation de base à l’allocation de fin de droits. Dans le système d’allocation unique dégressive (AUD) introduit en 1992, le profil d’indemnisation se caractérise par des baisses régulières du montant de l’allocation. L’estimation de modèles de durée montre que dans la réglementation en vigueur avant 1992, le taux de reprise d'emploi augmente fortement à l'approche de la fin de la période d'indemnisation à taux plein. Ce pic dans la reprise d’emploi n’est plus observé dans la nouvelle réglementation: l'introduction de l'AUD a écrêté le profil temporel des taux de reprise d'emploi. Ce résultat vaut principalement pour les chômeurs qui bénéficiaient en emploi d’un salaire élevé. On observe un écart très significatif entre les probabilités de rester en chômage dans l'ancienne et la nouvelle réglementation (AUD). La conjoncture macroéconomique plus défavorable qui caractérise la période postérieure à 1992 n’explique qu’en partie cette différence. Ainsi, la dégressivité, telle qu'elle a été mise en oeuvre de 1992 à 1996, aurait ralenti le retour à l'emploi. [ger] Analysiert wird der Effekt des Zeitprofils der Arbeitslosenunterstützung auf die Quote der Arbeitslosen, die wieder eine Beschäftigung aufnehmen, wobei zwei sukzessive Regelungen miteinander verglichen werden. Die Regelung, die von 1986 bis 1992 vor Einführung der degressiven einheitlichen Unterstützung galt, zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass das Entschädigungsniveau nur ein einziges Mal sinkt, während bei der 1992 eingeführten degressiven einheitlichen Unterstützung regelmäßige Absenkungen vorgesehen sind. . Die Schätzungen anhand von Zeitmodellen zeigen, dass bei der bis 1992 geltenden Regelung die Quote der Arbeitslosen, die wieder eine Beschäftigung aufnahmen, mit Herannahen des Endes der Entschädigung zum vollen Satz stark zunimmt. Dies gilt vor allem für die Arbeitslosen, deren früherer Lohn ziemlich hoch war. Mit der Einführung der degressiven einheitlichen Unterstützung wurde das Zeitprofil der Quoten der Wiederaufnahme einer Beschäftigung abgeflacht. Die als sehr signifikant geschätzte Differenz zwischen den Wahrscheinlichkeiten, bei der alten und bei der neuen Regelung arbeitslos zu bleiben, ist nur zum Teil auf die Schwankung der Wirtschaftskonjunktur zurückzuführen. Es bleibt eine Differenz, die durch eine Änderung der Zeitprofile der Entschädigung erklärt werden kann. Mit anderen Worten: die Degression, wie sie zwischen 1992 und 1996 zur Anwendung kam, hätte demnach die Rückkehr zur Beschäftigung verlangsamt. [spa] El efecto del perfil económico temporal de la indemnización del paro sobre la tasa de la vuelta al empleo de los parados se hace patente al comparar dos reglamentaciones sucesivas. La reglamentación que se ha dado de 1986 a 1992, antes de la introducción del subsidio único degresivo (AUD), se caracteriza por una única baja del nivel de indemnización, mientras que el AUD introducido en 1992 preve unas bajas regulares de su monto. . Las estimaciones llevadas a cabo a partir de modelos de duración, muestran que en la reglamentación de antes de 1992 la tasa de vuelta al empleo aumenta con creces cuando se acerca el fin del periodo de indemnización a plena tasa. Este resultado es valedero esencialmente para aquellos desempleados cuyos salarios antes del paro eran los más altos. La introducción del AUD ha borrado el perfil temporal de las tasas de vuelta al empleo. La diferencia bastante fuerte entre las probabilidades de permanecer en el paro con la antigua o la nueva reglamentación se puede atribuir sólo por parte a la variación de la coyuntura macroeconómica. La diferencia que queda se puede explicar por el cambio de los perfiles temporales de indemnización. En otros términos, la degresividad, tal y como ha sido instaurada de 1992 a 1996, habría frenado la vuelta al empleo.

Suggested Citation

  • Brigitte Dormont & Denis Fougère & Ana Prieto, 2001. "L'effet de l'allocation unique dégressive sur la reprise d'emploi," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 343(1), pages 3-28.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2001_num_343_1_7457
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.2001.7457
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.2001.7457
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/estat.2001.7457
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/estat_0336-1454_2001_num_343_1_7457
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/estat.2001.7457?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Holmlund, Bertil, 1997. "Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice," Working Paper Series 1997:25, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    2. Carling, Kenneth & Holmlund, Bertil & Vejsiu, Altin, 2001. "Do Benefit Cuts Boost Job Finding? Swedish Evidence from the 1990s," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(474), pages 766-790, October.
    3. Ana Prieto, 2000. "L'impact de la dégressivité des allocations chômage sur le taux de reprise d'emploi," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 51(3), pages 523-534.
    4. Joel L. Horowitz, 1999. "Semiparametric Estimation of a Proportional Hazard Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1001-1028, September.
    5. Gerard J. van den Berg, 1990. "Nonstationarity in Job Search Theory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(2), pages 255-277.
    6. Bertil Holmlund, 1998. "Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(1), pages 113-141, March.
    7. Heckman, James & Singer, Burton, 1984. "A Method for Minimizing the Impact of Distributional Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 271-320, March.
    8. Meyer, Bruce D, 1990. "Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 757-782, July.
    9. Katz, Lawrence F. & Meyer, Bruce D., 1990. "The impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 45-72, February.
    10. W. Henry Chiu & Edi Karni, 1998. "Endogenous Adverse Selection and Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 806-827, August.
    11. Imbens, G W, 1994. "Transition Models in a Non-stationary Environment," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(4), pages 703-720, November.
    12. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-438, April.
    13. Lippman, Steven A & McCall, John J, 1976. "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 347-368, September.
    14. Shavell, Steven & Weiss, Laurence, 1979. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1347-1362, December.
    15. Dale T. Mortensen, 1977. "Unemployment Insurance and Job Search Decisions," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 30(4), pages 505-517, July.
    16. Xavier Joutard & Michèle Ruggiero, 1994. "Taux de sortie du chômage à l'approche de la fin des droits à l'indemnisation. Une étude de périodes atypiques durant l'épisode de chômage," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 113(2), pages 189-205.
    17. Lippman, Steven A & McCall, John J, 1976. "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey: Part I," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(2), pages 155-189, June.
    18. Atkinson, Anthony B & Micklewright, John, 1991. "Unemployment Compensation and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 29(4), pages 1679-1727, December.
    19. Liliane Bonnal & Denis Fougère & Anne Sérandon, 1997. "Evaluating the Impact of French Employment Policies on Individual Labour Market Histories," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(4), pages 683-713.
    20. Moffitt, Robert & Nicholson, Walter, 1982. "The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Unemployment: The Case of Federal Supplemental Benefits," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(1), pages 1-11, February.
    21. Holmlund, Bertil, 1998. " Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(1), pages 113-141, March.
    22. Lancaster, Tony & Chesher, Andrew, 1983. "An Econometric Analysis of Reservation Wages," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1661-1676, November.
    23. Baker, Michael & Melino, Angelo, 2000. "Duration dependence and nonparametric heterogeneity: A Monte Carlo study," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 357-393, June.
    24. Narendranathan, Wiji & Nickell, Stephen, 1985. "Modelling the process of job search," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 29-49, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yann Algan & Arnaud Cheron & Jean-Olivier Hairault & Francois Langot, 2003. "Wealth Effect on Labor Market Transitions," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(1), pages 156-178, January.
    2. Philippe Askenazy & Eve Caroli & Jérôme Gautié, 2009. "Un panorama des bas salaires et de la qualité de l'emploi peu qualifié en France," Working Papers halshs-00567693, HAL.
    3. Bruno Coquet, 2020. "Dégressivité des allocations chômage : que peut-on en attendre ?," Working Papers hal-03370452, HAL.
    4. Bruno, CREPON & Muriel, DEJEMEPPE & Marc, GURGAND, 2005. "Counseling the unemployed : does it lower unemployment duration and recurrence ?," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005034, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    5. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8884 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, July.
    7. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2vagho9cns9668gqt9f4q5v8rg is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Anders Forslund & Alan Krueger, 2010. "Did Active Labor Market Policies Help Sweden Rebound from the Depression of the Early 1990s?," NBER Chapters, in: Reforming the Welfare State: Recovery and Beyond in Sweden, pages 159-187, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Bart, COCKX & Jean, RIES, 2004. "The Exhaustion of Unemployment Benefits in Belgium. Does it Enhance the Probability of Employment ?," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2004016, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    10. Balazs Egert, 2013. "The Efficiency and Equity of the Tax and Transfer System in France," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp1047, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    11. Yann Algan & Antoine Terracol, 2001. "L'influence de l'épargne de précaution sur la recherche d'emploi," Post-Print hal-01017893, HAL.
    12. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/8884 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Bruno Coquet, 2017. "Les allocations chômage devraient-elles être dégressives ?," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03457573, HAL.
    14. Le Barbanchon, Thomas, 2016. "The effect of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on unemployment exits to work and match quality in France," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 16-29.
    15. Anders Forslund & Alan Krueger, 2010. "Did Active Labor Market Policies Help Sweden Rebound from the Depression of the Early 1990s?," NBER Chapters, in: Reforming the Welfare State: Recovery and Beyond in Sweden, pages 159-187, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Yann Algan & Antoine Terracol, 2001. "L'influence de l'épargne de précaution sur la recherche d'emploi," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 349(1), pages 63-76.
    17. Cavaco, Sandra & Lesueur, Jean-Yves & Sabatier, Mareva & Lesueur, Jean-Yves, 2004. "Stratégies de recherche, contraintes spatiales et hétérogénéité des transitions vers l’emploi : estimation économétrique d’un modèle structurel de recherche," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 80(2), pages 439-464, Juin-Sept.
    18. Emmanuel Duguet & Antoine Goujard & Yannick L’Horty, 2008. "Les inégalités territoriales d'accès à l'emploi : une exploration à partir de sources administratives exhaustives," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 415(1), pages 17-44.
    19. Rioux, Laurence & Lollivier, Stefan, 2005. "A Structural Non-Stationary Model of Job Search: Stigmatization of the Unemployed by Job Offers or Wage Offers?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5108, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Alba-Ramirez, Alfonso & Arranz, Jose M. & Munoz-Bullon, Fernando, 2007. "Exits from unemployment: Recall or new job," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 788-810, October.
    21. Emmanuel Duguet & Antoine Goujard & Yannick L’Horty & Florent Sari, 2009. "Elaborer un diagnostic territorial sur l’emploi à partir de sources administratives exhaustives : une application en Languedoc-Roussillon," Documents de recherche 09-06, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
    22. Lauer, Charlotte, 2003. "Education and Unemployment: A French-German Comparison," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-34, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    23. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8884 is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. A. Prieto, 2000. "L'introduction d'une allocation chômage dégressive en France en 1992. Quel impact sur la reprise de l'emploi ? Etude économétrique menée à partir du Fichier National des Allocataires de l'UNEDIC sur l," THEMA Working Papers 2000-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    2. Konstantinos Tatsiramos & Jan C. Ours, 2014. "Labor Market Effects Of Unemployment Insurance Design," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 284-311, April.
    3. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, July.
    4. J. Ignacio García‐Pérez, 2006. "Job separation in a non‐stationary search model: a structural estimation to evaluate alternative unemployment insurance systems," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(2), pages 245-272, March.
    5. José Ignacio García Pérez, 2003. "Non-stationary Job Search When Jobs Do Not Last Forever: A Structural Estimation to Evaluate Alternative Unemployment Insurance Systems," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/49, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    6. Røed, Knut & Jensen, Peter & Thoursie, Anna, 2002. "Unemployment Duration, Incentives and Institutions - A Micro-Econometric Analysis Based on Scandinavian Data," Working Paper Series 3/2002, Stockholm University, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
    7. Roed, Knut & Zhang, Tao, 2005. "Unemployment duration and economic incentives--a quasi random-assignment approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1799-1825, October.
    8. Roed, Knut & Nordberg, Morten, 2003. "Temporary layoffs and the duration of unemployment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 381-398, June.
    9. Chantal Cases, 1996. "Assurance-chômage et offre de travail," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 291(1), pages 139-150.
    10. Milan Vodopivec, 2004. "Income Support for the Unemployed : Issues and Options," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 14922, December.
    11. Xavier Joutard & Michèle Ruggiero, 1996. "Changements de régime d'indemnisation et transitions vers l'emploi : une étude sur données longitudinales UNEDIC," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(1), pages 143-166.
    12. Ana Iturriza & Arjun S. Bedi & Robert Sparrow, 2011. "Unemployment Assistance and Transition to Employment in Argentina," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages 811-837.
    13. Krueger, Alan B. & Meyer, Bruce D., 2002. "Labor supply effects of social insurance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 33, pages 2327-2392, Elsevier.
    14. Lalive, Rafael & Zweimuller, Josef, 2004. "Benefit entitlement and unemployment duration: The role of policy endogeneity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2587-2616, December.
    15. Chantal Cases & Stefan Lollivier, 1994. "Estimation d'un modèle de sortie de chômage à destinations multiples," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 113(2), pages 177-187.
    16. Rafael Lalive & Jan Van Ours & Josef Zweimuller, 2006. "How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(4), pages 1009-1038.
    17. Tito Boeri & Jan van Ours, 2013. "The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets: Second Edition," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10142.
    18. Knut Roed & Tao Zhang, 2003. "Does Unemployment Compensation Affect Unemployment Duration?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 190-206, January.
    19. Chantal Cases, 1994. "Durées de chômage et comportements d'offre de travail : une revue de la littérature," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 113(2), pages 155-170.
    20. Jan Boone & Jan Ours, 2012. "Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?," De Economist, Springer, vol. 160(4), pages 413-438, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2001_num_343_1_7457. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/estat .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.