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Multihoming and platform choice in online food delivery

Author

Listed:
  • Edgardo Manuel Jopson

    (Philippine Competition Commission, Ateneo de Manila University)

  • Fabio M. Manenti

    (University of Padua)

  • Franco Mariuzzo

    (University of East Anglia)

  • Shereena S. Salas

    (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)

  • Junjun Zhang

    (University of East Anglia)

Abstract

This paper examines multihoming in the Philippine online food delivery (OFD) market using two original cross sectional surveys of users and delivery riders. We distinguish two margins of platform participation: multihoming as a margin of engagement and single homing as a margin of specialization. On the user side, multihoming is more common among users with higher delivery demand, as spreading orders across platforms becomes attractive when demand is frequent enough to justify using two apps. Conditional on single homing, platform choice is shaped by a monetary service dimension: users in areas with larger rider networks are more likely to choose GrabFood, while those in areas with larger restaurant networks are less likely to do so. Loyalty also remains a strong sorting device. On the rider side, multihoming is concentrated in thicker local demand environments and is less prevalent among riders who report insufficient ride opportunities on competing apps. Conditional on single-homing, platform choice reflects the way platforms bundle demand, compensation, and administrative requirements, rather than differences in market size alone.

Suggested Citation

  • Edgardo Manuel Jopson & Fabio M. Manenti & Franco Mariuzzo & Shereena S. Salas & Junjun Zhang, 2026. "Multihoming and platform choice in online food delivery," Philippine Review of Economics, University of the Philippines School of Economics and Philippine Economic Society, vol. 63(1), pages 100-141, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:phs:prejrn:v:63:y:2026:i:1:p:100-141
    as

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    File URL: https://pre.econ.upd.edu.ph/index.php/pre/article/view/1087/1035
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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