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Multihoming and Oligopolistic Platform Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Tat-How Teh
  • Chunchun Liu
  • Julian Wright
  • Junjie Zhou

Abstract

We provide a general framework to analyze competition between any number of symmetric two-sided transaction platforms, in which buyers and sellers can multihome. We show how key primitives such as the number of platforms, the fraction of buyers that find multihoming costly, the value of transactions, and the degree of user heterogeneity jointly determine the level and structure of platform fees. Even though platform entry always reduces the total fee level, whether it shifts the fee structure in favor of buyers or sellers depends on whether most of the buyers are singlehoming or multihoming.

Suggested Citation

  • Tat-How Teh & Chunchun Liu & Julian Wright & Junjie Zhou, 2023. "Multihoming and Oligopolistic Platform Competition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 68-113, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:68-113
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210324
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kawaguchi, Kohei & Kuroda, Toshifumi & Sato, Susumu, 2023. "Relevant markets and market power of mobile apps," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    2. Martin Peitz, 2023. "Governance and Regulation of Platforms," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_480, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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