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Does Local Elite Capture Vary by Levels of Political Connections? Evidence from an Indian Public Housing Program

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  • Sitakanta Panda

    (Indian Institute of Technology Bhilai)

Abstract

Local political connections form an important channel through which elite capture of public welfare programs takes place. However, the levels of connectedness of households with politicians or political executives and how local power hierarchy wields clout differ in degrees and contexts. This aspect—differences in elite capture by varying levels of local political connections—has been under-studied, if not unexplored. We find households connected to local political executives are more likely to obtain a poverty-alleviating public housing program benefit, namely, the erstwhile Indira Awas Yojana (IAY) scheme, than a non-connected household in rural India. Neither connection to a higher-level elected representative (MP/MLA/Zilla Parishad member) nor connection to a local political party official (who is not in any executive power position) nor some party membership of a family person has a significant effect (than local political connections) on IAY provisioning. Understanding how local power hierarchy or elite connections can influence public program targeting has critical policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Sitakanta Panda, 2022. "Does Local Elite Capture Vary by Levels of Political Connections? Evidence from an Indian Public Housing Program," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 34(4), pages 1912-1939, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:eurjdr:v:34:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1057_s41287-021-00447-4
    DOI: 10.1057/s41287-021-00447-4
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Housing; Political connections; Political elite capture; Poverty; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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