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Political Connections and Elite Capture in a Poverty Alleviation Programme in India

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  • Sitakanta Panda

Abstract

Political elite capture in public welfare programmes is rife in the low-income countries. Analysing a nationally-representative Indian household survey dataset, we examine the political connections hypothesis and find that a household connected to a local political executive (somebody close or as a family member) vis-�-vis not connected significantly increases the probability of its obtaining an important poverty-alleviating entitlement; that is, a below-poverty-line ration card in all three contexts: national, rural, and urban. This ubiquity of political elite capture at the local government level has guiding policy implications for the beneficiary identification process in the future.

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  • Sitakanta Panda, 2015. "Political Connections and Elite Capture in a Poverty Alleviation Programme in India," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(1), pages 50-65, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jdevst:v:51:y:2015:i:1:p:50-65
    DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2014.947281
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Banerjee, Abhijit V. & Pande, Rohini, 2007. "Parochial Politics: Ethnic Preferences and Politician Corruption," Working Paper Series rwp07-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    2. Pande, Rohini, 2008. "Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries," Handbook of Development Economics, in: T. Paul Schultz & John A. Strauss (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 50, pages 3155-3184, Elsevier.
    3. Blakeslee, David S., 2018. "Politics and public goods in developing countries: Evidence from the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 1-19.
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    1. Lendie Follett & Heath Henderson, 2022. "A hybrid approach to targeting social assistance," Papers 2201.01356, arXiv.org.
    2. Akanksha Negi & Digvijay Singh Negi, 2022. "Difference-in-Differences with a Misclassified Treatment," Papers 2208.02412, arXiv.org.
    3. Schleicher, Michael & Souares, Aurélia & Pacere, Athanase Narangoro & Sauerborn, Rainer & Klonner, Stefan, 2016. "Decentralized versus Statistical Targeting of Anti-Poverty Programs: Evidence from Burkina Faso," Working Papers 0623, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    4. Akerkar, Supriya & Joshi, P.C. & Fordham, Maureen, 2016. "Cultures of Entitlement and Social Protection: Evidence from Flood Prone Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 46-58.
    5. Asri, Viola, 2019. "Targeting of social transfers: Are India’s poor older people left behind?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 46-63.
    6. Cheng, Xiaoyu & Wang, Jianying & Chen, Kevin Z., 2022. "Does villager social capital hinder poverty targeting? Evidence from poverty-stricken county of Western China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    7. Trinh, Trong-Anh & Feeny, Simon & Posso, Alberto, 2022. "Political connections and post-disaster assistance in rural Vietnam," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    8. Rihem Braham & Christian Peretti & Lotfi Belkacem, 2022. "On the Measurement and Extent of Banks’ Political Connection in the Middle East and North Africa Region," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 64(4), pages 606-645, December.
    9. Xuechao Li & Yaxuan Luo & Huijuan Wang, 2023. "Effects of Targeted Poverty Alleviation on the Sustainable Livelihood of Poor Farmers," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(7), pages 1-21, April.
    10. Sitakanta Panda, 2022. "Does Local Elite Capture Vary by Levels of Political Connections? Evidence from an Indian Public Housing Program," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 34(4), pages 1912-1939, August.
    11. Vidhya Unnikrishnan & Subhasish Dey, 2023. "Political meddling in social assistance programme: Panel data evidence from India," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(6), pages 1346-1364, August.
    12. Follett, Lendie & Henderson, Heath, 2023. "A hybrid approach to targeting social assistance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    13. Chatterjee, Somdeep & Pal, Debdatta, 2021. "Is there political elite capture in access to energy sources? Evidence from Indian households," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    14. Asri, Viola & Michaelowa, Katharina & Panda, Sitakanta & Paul, Sourabh B., 2022. "The pursuit of simplicity: Can simplifying eligibility criteria improve social pension targeting?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 820-846.
    15. Han, Huawei & Gao, Qin, 2019. "Community-based welfare targeting and political elite capture: Evidence from rural China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 145-159.
    16. Balakumar, Suganya & Maitra, Debasish, 2023. "Do political connections or elite capture matter in access to financial services? Evidence from Indian households," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C).

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