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Legislator characteristics and legislative outcomes in India

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  • Sitakanta Panda

    (Institute of Economic Growth, University of Delhi Enclave, Delhi-110007, India)

Abstract

We empirically test the prediction that the personal attributes of the legislators critically determine the legislative performance of a legislature in an Indian context. Analyzing the data on the Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) in the state of Tamil Nadu in the 2006-11 Assembly batch, we examine how the various personal characteristics of the legislators affect two indicators of legislative outcomes – their attendance in the Assembly session-days and the number of the questions asked by them on public policy. We find that the legislators who are more affluent attend significantly fewer Assembly sessions than their less rich colleagues. The legislators who are more affluent and more educated and those who belong to the opposition party ask significantly less questions in the Assembly sessions. Though the session attendance and the asked questions can be part of a larger set of legislative performance indicators; in presence of data constraints, we argue these two can substantially signal the lawmakers' performance. [Keywords: Legislator quality, legislative outcomes, India.] [JEL classification: D72, H11.]

Suggested Citation

  • Sitakanta Panda, 2012. "Legislator characteristics and legislative outcomes in India," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3401-3416.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00752
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Saibal Ghosh, 2018. "An index of legislators’ performance: evidence from Indian parliamentary data," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 20(1), pages 129-151, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legislator quality; legislative performance; India.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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