Can State University Fees Increase Welfare? A Mixed Oligopoly Approach
When students are unable to borrow, exams can be more efficient than fees in allocating students to schools. Optimal fees will then be zero for a monopolistic state university, but they can be positive when there is competition with a private, revenue-oriented university. The reason is that, by raising its tuition fees, the state university induces the private university to enrol more students. As a result, total enrolments and thus welfare can increase. For this to be possible we need the private university (i) to be of lower quality and selective, or (ii) to be of higher quality and not selective.
Volume (Year): 165 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200912)165:4_670:csufiw_2.0.tx_2-k. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.