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Eine Analyse polit-ökonomischer Probleme bei Staatsumschuldungen

Author

Listed:
  • Eggert Wolfgang

    (Wolfgang Eggert, E-Mail: wolfgang.eggert@vwl.uni-freiburg.de)

  • Stephan Maximilian

    (Maximilian Stephan, Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie und Finanzwissenschaften, Albert-Ludwig-Universität Freiburg, Platz der Alten Synagoge 1,79098 Freiburg i. Br., Tel.: 0761 203–2362, E-Mail: maximilian.stephan@vwl.uni-freiburg.de)

  • von Ungern-Sternberg Handirk

    (Handirk von Ungern-Sternberg, E-Mail: handirk.von.ungern@vwl.uni-freiburg.de)

Abstract

Argentine (2005) and Greek (2012) debt restructuring programs lead to economic problems during the event. Conflicts among the creditors as well as between creditors and debtor arise during a debt restructuring. The difficulties are characterized by asymmetric information, uncertainty during the restructuring, willingness-to-pay, run-for-the-exit and holdout investors. We argue a holdout is not a destructive investor behaviour but a rational investment decision. The financial aid leads to moral hazard. The debtor could provide information to the creditors in order to reduce the information asymmetry, but if the debtor nation is not willing to do so, the creditors have practically no chance of receiving information on its financial status.

Suggested Citation

  • Eggert Wolfgang & Stephan Maximilian & von Ungern-Sternberg Handirk, 2016. "Eine Analyse polit-ökonomischer Probleme bei Staatsumschuldungen," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 65(2), pages 157-176, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:65:y:2016:i:2:p:157-176:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2016-0013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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