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Endogenous Timing in a Gaming Tournament

Author

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  • Kyung Hwan Baik
  • Todd Cherry
  • Stephan Kroll
  • Jason Shogren

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Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Kyung Hwan Baik & Todd Cherry & Stephan Kroll & Jason Shogren, 1999. "Endogenous Timing in a Gaming Tournament," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 1-21, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:47:y:1999:i:1:p:1-21 DOI: 10.1023/A:1005033020124
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ochs, Jack & Roth, Alvin E, 1989. "An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 355-384.
    2. Harrison, Glenn W, 1989. "Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 749-762, September.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-836, July.
    4. Harrison, Glenn W & Hirshleifer, Jack, 1989. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 201-225, February.
    5. Butler, J S & Moffitt, Robert, 1982. "A Computationally Efficient Quadrature Procedure for the One-Factor Multinomial Probit Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 761-764, May.
    6. Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Bognanno, Michael L, 1990. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1307-1324, December.
    7. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    8. Colin F. Camerer, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-188, Fall.
    9. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
    10. Raymond De Bondt & Irene Henriques, 1995. "Strategic Investment with Asymmetric Spillovers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(3), pages 656-674, August.
    11. Shogren, Jason F & Baik, Kyung H, 1992. "Favorites and Underdogs: Strategic Behavior in an Experimental Contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 191-205, September.
    12. Shogren, Jason F., 1997. "Self-interest and equity in a bargaining tournament with non-linear payoffs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 383-394, March.
    13. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1997. "Environmental Conflicts and the SLAPP," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 253-273, July.
    14. Baik, Kyung H & Shogren, Jason F, 1992. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 359-362, March.
    15. Constantinos Syropoulos, 1994. "Endogenous Timing in Games of Commercial Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(4), pages 847-864, November.
    16. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-898, December.
    17. Dragon, Robert & Garvey, Gerald T. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1996. "A collective tournament," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 223-227, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Shogren, Jason F. & Parkhurst, Gregory M. & McIntosh, Christopher, 2006. "Second-price auction tournament," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 99-107, July.
    2. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    3. Todd L. Cherry & Peter Frykblom & Jason F. Shogren, 2002. "Hardnose the Dictator," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1218-1221.
    4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta & Theodore L. Turocy, 2012. "Overdissipation and Convergence in Rent-seeking Experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules," Working Papers 12-13, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    5. Parkhurst, Gregory M. & Shogren, Jason F. & Bastian, Chris & Kivi, Paul & Donner, Jennifer & Smith, Rodney B. W., 2002. "Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 305-328, May.
    6. Hans-Theo Normann & Till Requate & Israel Waichman, 2014. "Do short-term laboratory experiments provide valid descriptions of long-term economic interactions? A study of Cournot markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(3), pages 371-390, September.
    7. Parkhurst, Gregory M. & Shogren, Jason F., 2007. "Spatial incentives to coordinate contiguous habitat," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 344-355, December.
    8. Cherry, Todd L., 2001. "Mental accounting and other-regarding behavior: Evidence from the lab," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 605-615, October.
    9. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Turocy, Theodore L., 2014. "Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 224-238.
    10. Eskander, Shaikh & Janus, Thorsten & Barbier, Edward, 2016. "Linking The Unlinked: Transboundary Water-Sharing Under Water-For-Leverage Negotiations," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, 2016, Boston, Massachusetts 235650, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    11. Cherry, Todd L. & Kroll, Stephan & Shogren, Jason F., 2005. "The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on public good contributions: evidence from the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 357-365, July.
    12. Cherry, Todd L. & Crocker, Thomas D. & Shogren, Jason F., 2003. "Rationality spillovers," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 63-84, January.
    13. Christopher R Mcintosh & Jason F Shogren & Andrew J Moravec, 2009. "Can tournaments induce rational play in the centipede game? Exploring dominance vs. strategic uncertainty," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 2018-2024.
    14. Shogren, Jason F., 1997. "Self-interest and equity in a bargaining tournament with non-linear payoffs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 383-394, March.

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    Keywords

    Contests; Gaming tournament; Timing;

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