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Algorithmic Pricing What Implications for Competition Policy?

Author

Listed:
  • Emilio Calvano

    (University of Bologna
    Toulouse School of Economics)

  • Giacomo Calzolari

    (CEPR
    Toulouse School of Economics
    European University Institute and University of Bologna)

  • Vincenzo Denicolò

    (University of Bologna
    CEPR)

  • Sergio Pastorello

    (University of Bologna)

Abstract

Pricing decisions are increasingly in the “hands” of artificial algorithms. Scholars and competition authorities have voiced concerns that those algorithms are capable of sustaining collusive outcomes more effectively than can human decision makers. If this is so, then our traditional policy tools for fighting collusion may have to be reconsidered. We discuss these issues by critically surveying the relevant law, economics, and computer science literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Emilio Calvano & Giacomo Calzolari & Vincenzo Denicolò & Sergio Pastorello, 2019. "Algorithmic Pricing What Implications for Competition Policy?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(1), pages 155-171, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:55:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11151-019-09689-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-019-09689-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Algorithmic pricing; Competition policy; Artificial intelligence; Machine learning; Collusion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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