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Antitrust and Vertical Integration in “New Economy” Industries with Application to Broadband Access

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  • Bruce Owen

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11151-011-9291-y
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Article provided by Springer & The Industrial Organization Society in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 38 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (June)
Pages: 363-386

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Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:38:y:2011:i:4:p:363-386
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-011-9291-y
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

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Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/industrial+organization/journal/11151/PS2

Keywords: Access; Antitrust; Broadband; Common carrier; Contracting; Essential facilities; Ex ante regulation; Firm boundaries; Industrial organization; Internet; Net neutrality; New economy; Pin factory; Schumpeter; Vertical integration; Vertical restraints; K20; K21; K23; L10; L11; L14; L22; L23; L24; L38; L40; L42; L50; L59; L82; L86; L96;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
  • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
  • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
  • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
  • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
  • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
  • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
  • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
  • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
  • L38 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Policy
  • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
  • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
  • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
  • L59 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Other
  • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
  • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
  • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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  1. Matthew Rhodes-Kropf & David T. Robinson, 2008. "The Market for Mergers and the Boundaries of the Firm," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1169-1211, 06.
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  10. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
  11. David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, 2002. "Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries," NBER Chapters,in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2, pages 1-50 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  13. Cooper, James C. & Froeb, Luke M. & O'Brien, Dan & Vita, Michael G., 2005. "Vertical antitrust policy as a problem of inference," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(7-8), pages 639-664, September.
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Cited by:

  1. Michael Peneder & Martin Woerter, 2014. "Competition, R&D and innovation: testing the inverted-U in a simultaneous system," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 653-687, July.
  2. Thomas Lenard, 2011. "Introduction: Antitrust and the Dynamics of Competition in High-Tech Industries," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 38(4), pages 311-317, June.
  3. repec:kap:revind:v:50:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-016-9556-6 is not listed on IDEAS

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