Blair disease? Business careers of the former democratic heads of state and government
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0325-8
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Kvartiuk, Vasyl & Herzfeld, Thomas, 2023.
"Why do farmers seek office? Regulatory capture in Russian agricultural subsidization,"
EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 61(2), pages 111-130.
- Vasyl Kvartiuk & Thomas Herzfeld, 2023. "Why Do Farmers Seek Office? Regulatory Capture in Russian Agricultural Subsidization," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 61(2), pages 111-130, March.
- Quaresima Federico & Santolini Raffaella & Fiorillo Fabio, 2020. "Political affiliation in post-parliamentary careers in Italian public enterprises," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 21(1), pages 35-64, April.
- Michelson, Noam, 2023. "The revolving door of former civil servants and firm value: A comprehensive approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
- Miroslav Palanský, 2021. "The value of political connections in the post-transition period: evidence from Czechia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(1), pages 121-154, July.
- Federico Quaresima & Fabio Fiorillo, 2020.
"The economics of politics: patronage and political selection in Italy,"
Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 27-48, March.
- Federico Quaresima & Fabio Fiorillo, 2016. "The Economics of Politics: Patronage and Political Selection in Italy," CESifo Working Paper Series 6233, CESifo.
- Bong Hwan Kim, 2018. "Is Narcissism Sustainable in CEO Leadership of State-Owned Enterprises?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(7), pages 1-13, July.
- Federico Quaresima & Fabio Fiorillo & Raffaella Santolini, 2018. "Does Political Affiliation Matter On Post-Parliamentary Careers In The Boards Of Public Enterprises?," Working Papers 429, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
- Alexander Baturo, 2016. "Cursus Honorum: Personal Background, Careers and Experience of Political Leaders in Democracy and Dictatorship—New Data and Analyses," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 4(2), pages 138-157.
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Keywords
Leadership; Revolving door; Career concerns; Political economy;All these keywords.
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