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Why and how do Political Actors Pursue Risky Reforms?

Author

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  • Barbara Vis

    (Department of Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, b.vis@fsw.vu.nl)

  • Kees van Kersbergen

    (Department of Political Science, Centre for Comparative Social Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences, both at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, cj.van.kersbergen@fsw.vu.nl)

Abstract

Why and how do political actors pursue risky welfare state reforms, in spite of the institutional mechanisms and political resistance that counteract change? This is one of the key puzzles of contemporary welfare state research, which is brought about by the absence of a complete account that identifies both the cause and causal mechanisms of risky reforms. In this article we offer a remedy for this lacuna. Prospect theory teaches us that political actors will only undertake risky reforms if they consider themselves to be in a losses domain, that is when their current situation is unacceptable. Next, we discuss the strategies that political actors use to avoid the blame associated with risky reforms. These provide the causal mechanisms linking cause and effect. The sudden outburst of risky reforms in formerly ‘immovable’ Italy provides an empirical illustration of our account.

Suggested Citation

  • Barbara Vis & Kees van Kersbergen, 2007. "Why and how do Political Actors Pursue Risky Reforms?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 153-172, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:19:y:2007:i:2:p:153-172
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629807074268
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrews, Matt, 2013. "Explaining Positive Deviance in Public Sector Reforms in Development," Working Paper Series rwp13-040, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    2. Fredriksson, Mio & Gustafsson, Inga-Britt & Winblad, Ulrika, 2019. "Cuts without conflict: The use of political strategy in local health system retrenchment in Sweden," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 237(C), pages 1-1.
    3. Hans Pitlik, 2017. "Österreich 2025 – Verwaltungsreform zwischen Effizienzstreben und Reformwiderständen. Ein Überblick," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 90(3), pages 205-217, March.
    4. Alexander Baturo & Slava Mikhaylov, 2016. "Blair disease? Business careers of the former democratic heads of state and government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(3), pages 335-354, March.
    5. Ispano, Alessandro & Schwardmann, Peter, 2017. "Cooperating over losses and competing over gains: A social dilemma experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 329-348.
    6. Andrews, Matt, 2014. "Can One Retell a Mozambican Reform Story through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation?," Working Paper Series rwp14-018, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    7. Matt Andrews, 2013. "Explaining Positive Deviance in Public Sector Reforms in Development," CID Working Papers 267, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    8. Ludek Kouba & Hans Pitlik, 2014. "I wanna live my life: Locus of Control and Support for the Welfare State," MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics 2014-46, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    9. Hans Pitlik & Luděk Kouba, 2013. "The Interrelation of Informal Institutions and Governance Quality in Shaping Welfare State Attitudes. WWWforEurope Working Paper No. 38," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 46924, April.
    10. Matt Andrews, 2014. "Can one retell a Mozambican reform story through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation?," CID Working Papers 278, Center for International Development at Harvard University.

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