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Why Do Farmers Seek Office? Regulatory Capture in Russian Agricultural Subsidization

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  • Vasyl Kvartiuk
  • Thomas Herzfeld

Abstract

This study examines whether Russian farmers who enter regional politics can skew local policies in their favor. We hypothesize that Russian regions with more local members of parliament (MPs) owning agricultural businesses and farmer-ministers are more likely to allocate higher agricultural subsidies. To test these hypotheses, we use a unique 2008–2015 panel dataset on agricultural subsidies in combination with qualitative data. We find that the pervasiveness of agricultural interest in local parliaments affects the size of agricultural subsidies. Regional agriculture ministers who own farms may play the role of “gatekeepers” to the subsidies.

Suggested Citation

  • Vasyl Kvartiuk & Thomas Herzfeld, 2023. "Why Do Farmers Seek Office? Regulatory Capture in Russian Agricultural Subsidization," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 61(2), pages 111-130, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mes:eaeuec:v:61:y:2023:i:2:p:111-130
    DOI: 10.1080/00128775.2022.2149556
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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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