IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Losers and losers: Some demographics of medical malpractice tort reforms

  • Andrew Friedson
  • Thomas Kniesner

    ()

Our research examines how recent reforms have affected a key aspect of patients’ implicit insurance present in medical malpractice torts. Specifically, we estimate how non-economic damages caps affected pre-trial settlement speed and settlement amounts. Maximum entropy (most likely) quantile regressions emphasize that the post-reform settlement effects most informative for policy evaluation differ greatly from OLS (mean) estimates and clarify the conclusion emerging. In particular, the effect of the tort reform here can best be thought of as a 25% tax on the asset value of settlements that exempts settlements involving infants. The social welfare effects of tort reform are less clear than the asset reduction effects due to likely health state dependent utility. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11166-012-9152-6
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.

Volume (Year): 45 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 115-133

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:45:y:2012:i:2:p:115-133
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100299

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Golan, Amos, 2007. "Information and entropy econometrics - volume overview and synthesis," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 138(2), pages 379-387, June.
  2. Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A. Seabury, 2009. "The Welfare Effects of Medical Malpractice Liability," NBER Working Papers 15383, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Thomas J. Kniesner & W. Kip Viscusi & James P. Ziliak, 2009. "Policy Relevant Heterogeneity in the Value of Statistical Life: New Evidence from Panel Data Quantile Regressions," Center for Policy Research Working Papers 118, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
  4. Donald Keenan & Donald Rudow & Arthur Snow, 2008. "Risk preferences and changes in background risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 139-152, April.
  5. Bera, A. K. & Galvao Jr, A. F. & Montes-Rojas, G. & Park, S. Y., 2010. "Which quantile is the most informative? Maximum likelihood, maximum entropy and quantile regression," Working Papers 10/08, Department of Economics, City University London.
  6. Ronen Avraham, 2007. "An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical Malpractice Settlement Payments," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(S2), pages S183-S229, 06.
  7. David A. Matsa, 2007. "Does Malpractice Liability Keep the Doctor Away? Evidence from Tort Reform Damage Caps," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(S2), pages S143-S182, 06.
  8. Joni Hersch & Jeffrey O'Connell & W. Kip Viscusi, 2007. "An Empirical Assessment of Early Offer Reform for Medical Malpractice," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(S2), pages S231-S259, 06.
  9. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Compulsory Arbitration, Arbitral Risk and Negotiated Settlements: A Case Study in Bargaining under Imperfect Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 69-82, January.
  10. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, 2006. "The Labor Market Effects of Rising Health Insurance Premiums," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 609-634, July.
  11. Viscusi, W Kip & Evans, William N, 1990. "Utility Functions That Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 353-74, June.
  12. Beomsoo Kim, 2007. "The Impact of Malpractice Risk on the Use of Obstetrics Procedures," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(S2), pages S79-S119, 06.
  13. W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia H. Born, 2005. "Damages Caps, Insurability, and the Performance of Medical Malpractice Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 72(1), pages 23-43.
  14. Daniel P. Kessler, 2011. "Evaluating the Medical Malpractice System and Options for Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 93-110, Spring.
  15. Viscusi, W Kip, 1988. "Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 101-21, January.
  16. Steffen Andersen & Glenn W. Harrison & Morten I. Lau & E. Elisabet Rutström, 2008. "Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 583-618, 05.
  17. Frank A. Sloan & Lindsey M. Chepke, 2008. "Medical Malpractice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262195720, June.
  18. Rubin Paul H. & Shepherd Joanna M., 2008. "The Demographics of Tort Reform," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 591-620, December.
  19. Kessler, Daniel & McClellan, Mark, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 353-90, May.
  20. James Andreoni & Charles Sprenger, 2010. "Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences: Discounted Expected Utility with a Disproportionate Preference for Certainty," NBER Working Papers 16348, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," NBER Working Papers 5466, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Golan, Amos, 2008. "Information and Entropy Econometrics — A Review and Synthesis," Foundations and Trends(R) in Econometrics, now publishers, vol. 2(1–2), pages 1-145, February.
  23. Thomas J. Kniesner & W. Kip Viscusi & Christopher Woock & James P. Ziliak, 2010. "The Value of a Statistical Life: Evidence from Panel Data," Center for Policy Research Working Papers 122, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:45:y:2012:i:2:p:115-133. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)

or (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.