The Labor Market Effects of Rising Health Insurance Premiums
We estimate the effect of rising health insurance premiums on wages, employment, and the distribution of part-time and full-time work using variation in medical malpractice payments driven by the recent "medical malpractice crisis." We estimate that a 10% increase in health insurance premiums reduces the aggregate probability of being employed by 1.2 percentage points, reduces hours worked by 2.4%, and increases the likelihood that a worker is employed only part time by 1.9 percentage points. For workers covered by employer provided health insurance, this increase in premiums results in an offsetting decrease in wages of 2.3%.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Frank A. Sloan & Lindsey M. Chepke, 2008. "Medical Malpractice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262195720, June.
- Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, 2005.
"The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Delivery of Health Care,"
in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 8
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Baicker Katherine & Chandra Amitabh, 2005. "The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Delivery of Health Care," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-29, January.
- Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, 2004. "The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Delivery of Health Care," NBER Working Papers 10709, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alan L. Gustman & Thomas L. Steinmeier, 2001.
"Imperfect Knowledge, Retirement and Saving,"
NBER Working Papers
8406, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kessler, Daniel & McClellan, Mark, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 353-90, May.
- Gruber, Jonathan, 1994. "The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 622-41, June.
- Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," NBER Working Papers 5466, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Janet Currie & Brigitte C. Madrian, 1998.
"Health, Health Insurance and the Labor Market,"
JCPR Working Papers
27, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:24:y:2006:i:3:p:609-634. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.