IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Distributors and film critics: does it take two to Tango?

  • S. Ravid

    ()

  • John Wald

    ()

  • Suman Basuroy

    ()

Registered author(s):

    Previous literature has documented the impact of critics on audience choices of movies. We investigate three issues regarding professional critics in the motion picture industry. First we document whether and to what extent critics and their recommendations exhibit a statistical bias toward specific studios. We show that reviews by a number of critics are significantly affected by the film distributor’s identity. A second question is whether audiences are able to distinguish between biased and unbiased critics. We cannot support the view that audiences put less weight on the views of biased critics; in fact, they may listen to them more. Third, we try to characterize critics who are more prone to bias. Surprisingly, but in accord with reputation models, we find that more reputable critics may be more biased; in particular, critics based in L.A. tend to significantly prefer specific studios. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10824-006-9019-2
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Cultural Economics.

    Volume (Year): 30 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 3 (December)
    Pages: 201-218

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:kap:jculte:v:30:y:2006:i:3:p:201-218
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100284

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1991. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-86.
    3. Scharfstein, David. & Stein, Jeremy C., 1988. "Herd behavior and investment," Working papers WP 2062-88., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    4. Jonathan Reuter & Eric Zitzewitz, 2005. "Do Ads Influence Editors? Advertising and Bias in the Financial Media," Finance 0501003, EconWPA.
    5. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 1996. "Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1105-34, December.
    6. Trueman, Brett, 1994. "Analyst Forecasts and Herding Behavior," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 97-124.
    7. Morgan, J. & Stocken, P., 1998. "An Analysis of Stock Recommendations," Papers 204, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    8. De Vany, A. & Walls, W.D., 2000. "Does Hollywood make too many R-Rated Movies? Risk, Stochastic Dominance, and the Illusion of Expectation," Papers 99-00-24, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
    9. Narasimhan Jegadeesh & Joonghyuk Kim & Susan D. Krische & Charles M. C. Lee, 2004. "Analyzing the Analysts: When Do Recommendations Add Value?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(3), pages 1083-1124, 06.
    10. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1995. "Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 1-25, February.
    11. C. Edward Fee, 2002. "The Costs of Outside Equity Control: Evidence from Motion Picture Financing Decisions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75(4), pages 681-712, October.
    12. Christie, William G & Schultz, Paul H, 1994. " Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(5), pages 1813-40, December.
    13. Holbrook, Morris B, 1999. " Popular Appeal versus Expert Judgments of Motion Pictures," Journal of Consumer Research, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 144-55, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jculte:v:30:y:2006:i:3:p:201-218. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)

    or (Christopher F. Baum)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.