Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance – A Case Study
In this paper, we aim to include rule making, implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs into the cost comparison of policy instruments. We use a simple partial equilibrium model and apply it to the textile industry. The model includes discrete abatement functions and costly monitoring and enforcement. The case study uses individual firm data to simulate the differences in abatement costs and compliance decisions between firms. We compare combinations of regulatory instruments (emission taxes, emission standards and technology standards) and enforcement instruments (criminal fines, civil fines and transaction offers). We show that the inclusion of information, monitoring and enforcement costs indeed alters the relative cost efficiency of the different instruments. Copyright Springer 2005
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Volume (Year): 32 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2009.
"The relative efficiency of market-based environmental policy instruments with imperfect compliance,"
International Tax and Public Finance,
Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(1), pages 25-42, February.
- Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2004. "The Relative Efficiency of Market-based Environmental Policy Instruments with Imperfect Compliance," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0415, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Sandra Rousseau & Carole M. Billiet, 2003. "Using emission standards under incomplete compliance," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0303, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)