Fiscal and monetary interactions when wage-setters are large: is there a role for corporatist policies?
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Volume (Year): 37 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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- Matthew B. Canzoneri & Robert E. Cumby & Behzad T. Diba, 2002. "Should the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve be concerned about fiscal policy?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 333-389.
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- Tito Boeri & Michael C. Burda, 2008. "Preferences for Collective versus Individualised Wage Setting," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-021, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
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- Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 575, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2007. "Is Corporatism Feasible?," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 340-359, 05.
- Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2003. "Is corporatism feasible?," Macroeconomics 0301003, EconWPA.
- Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Is corporatism feasible?," Macroeconomics 0504037, EconWPA.
- Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August.
- Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2007. "Monetary conservatism and fiscal coordination in a monetary union," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 56-63, January.
- Perotti, Roberto & Alesina, Alberto, 1997. "The Welfare State and Competitiveness," Scholarly Articles 4553027, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Oswald, Andrew J, 1982. "The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(367), pages 576-595, September.
- Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Bartolomeo & Patrizio Tirelli, 2007. "Fiscal Leadership and Coordination in the EMU," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 281-289, July. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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