Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining
This paper introduces a contract between the government and trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that an optimal contract can be implemented through an appropriately defined inflation target.
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- Lilia Cavallari, 2010. "Fiscal and monetary interactions when wage-setters are large: is there a role for corporatist policies?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 291-309, July.
- Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Patrizio Tirelli, 2004.
"The macroeconomics of social pacts,"
Labor and Demography
- Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Patrizio Tirelli, 2009. "The macroeconomics of social pacts," Post-Print hal-00701871, HAL.
- Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Tirelli Patrizio, 2007. "The macroeconomics of social pacts," wp.comunite 0028, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981.
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0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
- Francesco Lippi, 2003.
"Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 909-919.
- Francesco Lippi, 2000. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non Atomistic Wage Setters," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1354, Econometric Society.
- Francesco Lippi, 2000. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage-Setters," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 374, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Francesco Lippi, 2003. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters," CEIS Research Paper 17, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- Lippi, F., 2000. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage-Setters," Papers 374, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
- Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
- Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
- Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2007. "Monetary conservatism and fiscal coordination in a monetary union," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 56-63, January.
- Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 2002. "Revisiting the case for a populist central banker: A comment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 613-621, March.
- Jerger, Jurgen, 2002. "How strong is the case for a populist central banker? A note," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 623-632, March.
- Cavallari, Lilia, 2001. "Inflationary performance in a monetary union with large wage setters," ZEI Working Papers B 11-2001, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
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