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Optimal monetary policy under a floating regime with non-atomistic wage setters

In a micro-founded framework in line with the new open economy macroeconomics, the paper shows that the monetary policies of the domestic and foreign CB are strategic complements and the presence of an inflation-averse central bank (CB) abroad always increases employment in the home country. We demonstrate that a centralized wage setting and CB conservatism curb unemployment only if labor market distortions are sizeable. When labor distortions are sufficiently low, employment may be maximized by atomistic wage setters or a populist CB. Finally, the welfare analysis reveals that a nationally centralized wage bargaining system always maximizes welfare if monopoly distortions in the labor market are relevant, while the appointment of a populist CB or completely decentralized wage setting is optimal when monopoly distortions are not sizeable.

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File URL: http://repec.graduateinstitute.ch/pdfs/Working_papers/HEIWP12-2007.pdf
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Paper provided by Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies in its series IHEID Working Papers with number 12-2007.

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Length: 35
Date of creation: 12 Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gii:giihei:heiwp12-2007
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  1. Francesco Lippi, 2000. "Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 386, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  2. Cukierman, A. & Lippi, F., 2000. "Labor Markets and Monetary Union: a Strategic Analysis," Papers 365, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
  3. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Skott, Peter, 1997. "Stagflationary Consequences of Prudent Monetary Policy in a Unionized Economy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 609-22, October.
  5. Lippi, Francesco, 2001. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage-Setters: Some Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2819, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2002. "Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games," Macroeconomics 0207002, EconWPA.
  7. Francesco Lippi, 2000. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage-Setters," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 374, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  8. Layard, Richard & Nickell, Stephen & Jackman, Richard, 2005. "Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199279173, March.
  9. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 1998. "Risk and Exchange Rates," NBER Working Papers 6694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Oswald, Andrew J, 1982. "The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(367), pages 576-95, September.
  11. Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters: A Case for Non-Neutrality," CEPR Discussion Papers 2218, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  13. Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 2002. "Revisiting the case for a populist central banker: A comment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 613-621, March.
  14. Piga, Gustavo, 2000. " Dependent and Accountable: Evidence from the Modern Theory of Central Banking," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 563-95, December.
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