IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ipf/psejou/v45y2021i1p125-148.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Effects of fiscal credibility on inflation expectations: evidence from an emerging economy

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Camilo Anzoategui-Zapata

    (Universidad Autonoma Latinoamericana, Department of Economics, Medellin, Colombia)

  • Juan Camilo Galvis-Ciro

    (Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, Department of Economics, Medellin, Colombia)

Abstract

This paper analyses the impact of fiscal imbalances on expectations for an emerging economy with inflation targeting. In particular, based on the Colombian experience, we build a fiscal credibility index and evaluate its impact on inflation expectations for the 2004-2019 period. To analyse fiscal and monetary interactions, we propose an econometric model and use the OLS and GMM methods. The results show that the loss of fiscal credibility, associated with divergences between the fiscal deficit and agents’ expectations, can increase inflation expectations by between 9% and 12%. Furthermore, inflation expectations in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related to unemployment, GDP and exchange rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Camilo Anzoategui-Zapata & Juan Camilo Galvis-Ciro, 2021. "Effects of fiscal credibility on inflation expectations: evidence from an emerging economy," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 45(1), pages 125-148.
    • Handle: RePEc:ipf:psejou:v:45:y:2021:i:1:p:125-148
    DOI: 10.3326/pse.45.1.4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.pse-journal.hr/upload/files/pse/2021/1/4.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3326/pse.45.1.4?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hansen, Lars Peter, 1982. "Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 1029-1054, July.
    2. Wagner Piazza Gaglianone, 2017. "Empirical Findings on Inflation Expectations in Brazil: a survey," Working Papers Series 464, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    3. Afonso S Bevilaqua & Mário Mesquita & André Minella, 2008. "Brazil: taming inflation expectations," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Transmission mechanisms for monetary policy in emerging market economies, volume 35, pages 139-158, Bank for International Settlements.
    4. Juan Camilo Galvis Ciro & Helder Ferreira de Mendonça, 2017. "Effect of credibility and reputation on discretionary fiscal policy: empirical evidence from Colombia," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 1529-1552, December.
    5. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Souza, Ivan, 2020. "Sovereign default risk, debt uncertainty and fiscal credibility: The case of Brazil," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    6. Xavier Debrun & David Hauner & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2009. "Independent Fiscal Agencies," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 44-81, February.
    7. Urrutia, Miguel & Hofstetter, Marc & Hamann, Franz, 2014. "Inflation Targeting in Colombia, 2002-2012," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6394, Inter-American Development Bank.
    8. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    9. Martin Cerisola & Gaston Gelos, 2009. "What drives inflation expectations in Brazil? An empirical analysis," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(10), pages 1215-1227.
    10. N. Gregory Mankiw & Ricardo Reis & Justin Wolfers, 2004. "Disagreement about Inflation Expectations," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, Volume 18, pages 209-270, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. John Thornton & Chrysovalantis Vasilakis, 2020. "Do fiscal rules reduce government borrowing costs in developing countries?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(4), pages 499-510, October.
    12. Minea, Alexandru & Tapsoba, René, 2014. "Does inflation targeting improve fiscal discipline?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 185-203.
    13. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    14. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1984. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Brian Griffiths & Geoffrey E. Wood (ed.), Monetarism in the United Kingdom, pages 15-41, Palgrave Macmillan.
    15. Allan Drazen & Paul R. Masson, 1994. "Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(3), pages 735-754.
    16. Christopher Allsopp & David Vines, 2005. "The Macroeconomic Role of Fiscal Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(4), pages 485-508, Winter.
    17. Refet S Gürkaynak & Andrew Levin & Eric Swanson, 2010. "Does Inflation Targeting Anchor Long-Run Inflation Expectations? Evidence from the U.S., UK, and Sweden," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(6), pages 1208-1242, December.
    18. Roberts, John M., 1997. "Is inflation sticky?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 173-196, July.
    19. Carlos Hamilton V Araujo & Wagner P Gaglianone, 2010. "Survey-based inflation expectations in Brazil," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Monetary policy and the measurement of inflation: prices, wages and expectations, volume 49, pages 107-114, Bank for International Settlements.
    20. Berlemann, Michael & Elzemann, Jorg, 2006. "Are expectations on inflation and election outcomes connected? An empirical analysis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 354-359, June.
    21. F. Naert, 2011. "Credibility of Fiscal Policies and Independent Fiscal Bodies," Review of Business and Economic Literature, Intersentia, vol. 0(3), pages 288-309, September.
    22. de Mendonça, Helder Ferreira & Machado, Marcelo Rangel, 2013. "Public debt management and credibility: Evidence from an emerging economy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 10-21.
    23. Xavier Debrun & Tidiane Kinda, 2017. "Strengthening Post‐Crisis Fiscal Credibility: Fiscal Councils on the Rise – A New Dataset," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 38, pages 667-700, December.
    24. Vladimir Klyuev & Stephen Snudden, 2011. "Effects of Fiscal Consolidation in the Czech Republic," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 61(4), pages 306-326, August.
    25. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Tatiana Acar, 2018. "Fiscal credibility and disagreement in expectations about inflation: evidence for Brazil," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(2), pages 826-843.
    26. Miguel Urrutia & Franz Hamann & Marc Hofstetter, 2014. "Inflation Targeting in Colombia, 2002-2012," Research Department Publications IDB-WP-487, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    27. F. Naert, 2011. "Credibility of Fiscal Policies and Independent Fiscal Bodies," Review of Business and Economic Literature, Intersentia, vol. 56(3), pages 288-309, September.
    28. Mishkin, Frederic S. & Savastano, Miguel A., 2001. "Monetary policy strategies for Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 415-444, December.
    29. Helder de Mendonca, 2007. "Towards credibility from inflation targeting: the Brazilian experience," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(20), pages 2599-2615.
    30. Antonio Fatás & Ilian Mihov, 2003. "The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1419-1447.
    31. Ireland, Peter N., 1999. "Does the time-consistency problem explain the behavior of inflation in the United States?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 279-291, October.
    32. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-397, May.
    33. Strohsal, Till & Melnick, Rafi & Nautz, Dieter, 2016. "The time-varying degree of inflation expectations anchoring," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 62-71.
    34. Oya Celasun & R. Gaston Gelos & Alessandro Prati, 2004. "Obstacles to disinflation: what is the role of fiscal expectations? [‘Disinflation with imperfect credibility’]," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 19(40), pages 442-481.
    35. Lin, Shu & Ye, Haichun, 2009. "Does inflation targeting make a difference in developing countries?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 118-123, May.
    36. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2001. "Applications of Generalized Method of Moments Estimation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 87-100, Fall.
    37. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2009. "Monetary Policy Strategy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262513374, December.
    38. Engle, Robert & Granger, Clive, 2015. "Co-integration and error correction: Representation, estimation, and testing," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 39(3), pages 106-135.
    39. Bomfim, Antulio N & Rudebusch, Glenn D, 2000. "Opportunistic and Deliberate Disinflation under Imperfect Credibility," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(4), pages 707-721, November.
    40. Magda Kandil & Hanan Morsy, 2014. "Fiscal Stimulus and Credibility in Emerging Countries," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 420-439, June.
    41. Kennedy, Mike & Palerm, Angel, 2014. "Emerging market bond spreads: The role of global and domestic factors from 2002 to 2011," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 70-87.
    42. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    43. Marc Hofstetter & Franz Hamann & Miguel Urrutia, 2014. "Inflation Targeting in Colombia, 2002–12," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2014), pages 1-37, June.
    44. Helder Ferreira de Mendonça, 2005. "Inflation Bias: an appraisal," Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Center of Political Economy, vol. 25(2), pages 96-100.
    45. Johansen, Soren, 1991. "Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1551-1580, November.
    46. Helder Mendonça & Felipe Tostes, 2015. "The Effect of Monetary and Fiscal Credibility on Exchange Rate Pass-Through in an Emerging Economy," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 787-816, September.
    47. Enrique A. López-Enciso & Hernando Vargas-Herrera & Norberto Rodríguez-Niño, 2016. "La estrategia de inflación objetivo en Colombia. Una visión histórica," Borradores de Economia 952, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    48. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Juan Camilo Galvis Ciro & Helder Ferreira de Mendonça, 2017. "Effect of credibility and reputation on discretionary fiscal policy: empirical evidence from Colombia," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 1529-1552, December.
    2. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Nicolay, Rodolfo Tomás da Fonseca & Acar, Tatiana, 2019. "Do fiscal communication and clarity of fiscal announcements affect public debt uncertainty? Evidence from Brazil," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 38-60.
    3. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Paulo Henrique Lourenço Luna, 2022. "Do fiscal opacity, fiscal impulse, and fiscal credibility affect disagreement about economic growth forecasts? Empirical evidence from Brazil considering the period of political instability and presid," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 2356-2393, November.
    4. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Victor Maia, 2023. "The reaction of disagreements in inflation expectations to fiscal sentiment obtained from information in official communiqués," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 828-859, October.
    5. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Tatiana Acar, 2018. "Fiscal credibility and disagreement in expectations about inflation: evidence for Brazil," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(2), pages 826-843.
    6. Ana Jordânia De Oliveira & Gabriel Caldas Montes & Rodolfo Nicolay, 2018. "Fiscal Credibility And Central Bank Credibility: How Do We Build Them? Empirical Evidence From Brazil," Anais do XLIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 44th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 43, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    7. G. C. Montes & R. T. F. Nicolay, 2017. "Does clarity of central bank communication affect credibility? Evidences considering governor-specific effects," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(32), pages 3163-3180, July.
    8. Juan Camilo Galvis-Ciro & Juan Camilo Anzoátegui-Zapata & Cristina Isabel Ramos-Barroso, 2022. "The Effect of Communication and Credibility on Fiscal Disagreement: Empirical Evidence from Colombia," Journal of Business Cycle Research, Springer;Centre for International Research on Economic Tendency Surveys (CIRET), vol. 18(3), pages 215-238, November.
    9. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & de Hollanda Lima, Natalia Teixeira, 2022. "Discretionary fiscal policy, fiscal credibility and inflation risk premium," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 208-222.
    10. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Almeida, André Filipe Guedes, 2016. "Compromisso fiscal, expectativas empresariais e produção industrial: o caso brasileiro," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 70(2), July.
    11. Helder Ferreira de Mendonça & Roseli da Silva, 2016. "2333-2349," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32767(4), pages 2333-2349.
    12. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Nicolay, Rodolfo & Pereira, Flavio, 2022. "Does fiscal sentiment matter for sovereign risk?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 18-30.
    13. Rodolfo Tomás Da Fonseca Nicolay & Gabriel Caldas Montes, 2014. "Comunicação Do Banco Central,Expectativas De Inflação E Profecia Auto-Realizável: Evidências Para Obrasil," Anais do XL Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 40th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 046, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    14. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Acar, Tatiana, 2020. "Fiscal credibility, target revisions and disagreement in expectations about fiscal results," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 38-58.
    15. Montes, Gabriel Caldas, 2013. "Credibility and monetary transmission channels under inflation targeting: An econometric analysis from a developing country," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 670-684.
    16. Helder Mendonça & Felipe Tostes, 2015. "The Effect of Monetary and Fiscal Credibility on Exchange Rate Pass-Through in an Emerging Economy," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 787-816, September.
    17. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Curi, Alexandre, 2017. "Disagreement in expectations about public debt, monetary policy credibility and inflation risk premium," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 46-61.
    18. de Mendonça, Helder Ferreira & Tiberto, Bruno Pires, 2017. "Effect of credibility and exchange rate pass-through on inflation: An assessment for developing countries," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 196-244.
    19. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Caio Ferrari Ferreira, 2019. "Does monetary policy credibility mitigate the effects of uncertainty about exchange rate on uncertainties about both inflation and interest rate?," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 649-678, October.
    20. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Rodolfo Tomás da Fonseca Nicolay, 2015. "Central bank’s perception on inflation and inflation expectations of experts," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 42(6), pages 1142-1158, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    inflation expectations; fiscal policy; credibility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E37 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ipf:psejou:v:45:y:2021:i:1:p:125-148. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Martina Fabris (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ijfffhr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.