IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Inflation-Forecast-Based Rules and Indeterminacy: A Puzzle and a Resolution

Listed author(s):
  • Paul Levine

    (University of Surrey)

  • Peter McAdam

    (European Central Bank)

  • Joseph Pearlman

    (London Metropolitan University)

We examine an interesting puzzle in monetary economics between what monetary authorities claim (namely, to be forward looking and preemptive) and the poor stabilization properties routinely reported for forecast-based rules. Our resolution is that central banks should be viewed as following 'Calvo-type' inflation-forecast-based (IFB) interest rate rules that depend on a discounted sum of current and future rates of inflation. Such rules might be regarded as both within the legal frameworks and potentially mimicking central bankers' practice. We find that Calvo-type IFB interest rate rules are, first, less prone to indeterminacy than standard rules with a finite forward horizon. Second, in difference form, the indeterminacy problem disappears altogether. Third, optimized forms have good stabilization properties as they become more forward looking, a property that sharply contrasts that of standard IFB rules. Fourth, they appear data coherent when incorporated into a well-known estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the euro area.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb07q4a3.pdf
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb07q4a3.htm
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by International Journal of Central Banking in its journal International Journal of Central Banking.

Volume (Year): 3 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 77-110

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2007:q:4:a:3
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.ijcb.org/

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Batini, Nicoletta & Justiniano, Alejandro & Levine, Paul & Pearlman, Joseph, 2006. "Robust inflation-forecast-based rules to shield against indeterminacy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(9-10), pages 1491-1526.
  2. Lars E O Svensson, 2005. "Monetary Policy with Judgment: Forecast Targeting," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(1), May.
  3. Lars E. O. Svensson, 1996. "Price Level Targeting vs. Inflation Targeting: A Free Lunch?," NBER Working Papers 5719, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Michael Woodford, 1999. "Commentary : how should monetary policy be conducted in an era of price stability?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 277-316.
  5. Andrew Levin & Volker Wieland & John C. Williams, 2003. "The Performance of Forecast-Based Monetary Policy Rules Under Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 622-645, June.
  6. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
  7. Bullard, James & Mitra, Kaushik, 2002. "Learning about monetary policy rules," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1105-1129, September.
  8. Smets, Frank & Wouters, Raf, 2002. "An estimated stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model of the euro area," Working Paper Series 0171, European Central Bank.
  9. Currie,David & Levine,Paul, 2009. "Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521104609, March.
  10. repec:cup:macdyn:v:6:y:2002:i:1:p:85-110 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Athanasios Orphanides, 2001. "Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 964-985, September.
  12. De Fiore, Fiorella & Liu, Zheng, 2002. "Openness and equilibrium determinacy under interest rate rules," Working Paper Series 0173, European Central Bank.
  13. Vestin, David, 2000. "Price-level Targeting versus Inflation Targeting in a Forward-looking Model," Working Paper Series 106, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
  14. Onatski, Alexei & Stock, James H., 2002. "Robust Monetary Policy Under Model Uncertainty In A Small Model Of The U.S. Economy," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(01), pages 85-110, February.
  15. Bernanke, Ben S & Woodford, Michael, 1997. "Inflation Forecasts and Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 653-684, November.
  16. Nicoletta Batini & Joseph Pearlman, 2002. "Too Much Too Soon: Instability and Indeterminacy with Forward-Looking Rules," Discussion Papers 08, Monetary Policy Committee Unit, Bank of England.
  17. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1975. ""Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 241-254, April.
  18. Svensson, Lars E. O., 2005. "Monetary policy with judgment: forecast targeting," Working Paper Series 476, European Central Bank.
  19. Frank Smets & Raf Wouters, 2003. "An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1123-1175, 09.
  20. Vestin, David, 2006. "Price-level versus inflation targeting," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1361-1376, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2007:q:4:a:3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bank for International Settlements)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.