The structure of corporate ownership in privatized utilities
Shareholder dispersion may be valuable because a credible commitment by shareholders not to interfere allows managers to benefit from their initiatives. A tougher regulatory regime for investors decreases the value of the commitment not to interfere implicit in a more dispersed ownership structure. Deregulation, captured through increasing monitoring costs, also has the effect of causing higher shareholder concentration. Political objectives may yield higher (through collusion between managers and politicians) or lower (through collusion between politicians and blockholders) dispersion than the benchmark case where the government maximizes shareholder proceeds. (Copyright: Fundación SEPI)
Volume (Year): 28 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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