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Credit risk transfer, informed markets, and securitization

Author

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  • Susan M. Wachter

Abstract

Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) funded the U.S. housing bubble, while the ensuing bust resulted in systemic risk and the global financial crisis of 2007-09. In the run-up to the crisis, MBS pricing failed to reveal the growing credit risk. This article draws lessons from this failure that could inform the use of credit risk transfers (CRTs) to price credit risk. The author concludes that the CRT market, as currently constituted, could have appropriately priced and revealed credit risk during the bubble years because it met three key requirements: 1) transparency, through the full provision of information on the mortgages underlying the CRTs and the standardization of mortgages that arose from the predominance of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae in the mortgage market; 2) open pricing in liquid markets; and 3) no counterparty risk. The author also describes areas of GSE reform that could either impair or enhance the ability of the CRT market to limit credit risk going forward, including the possible presence of multiple guarantors and the use of a common securitization platform.

Suggested Citation

  • Susan M. Wachter, 2018. "Credit risk transfer, informed markets, and securitization," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue 24-3, pages 117-137.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednep:00057
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. David Finkelstein & Andreas Strzodka & James Vickery, 2018. "Credit risk transfer and de facto GSE reform," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue 24-3, pages 88-116.
    2. Andrey Pavlov & Eduardo Schwartz & Susan Wachter, 2021. "Price Discovery Limits in the Credit Default Swap Market in the Financial Crisis," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 165-186, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    GSEs; transparency; credit risk transfer; securitization; market efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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