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CEO Compensation System in Large Canadian Financial Institutions

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  • Yusuf Mohammed Nulla
  • Dimitris Nikolaou Koumparoulis

Abstract

This study investigated the CEO Compensation system of the Canadian Financial Institutions. It attested the relationship between the CEO Compensation, the Firm Size, the Firm Performance, and the CEO Power, in the TSX/S&P index companies from the period 2005 to the period 2010. The totalled of the eighteen largest Canadian financial companies were selected through the random sampling method from the TSX/S&P index. The research question for this study was: is there a relationship between the CEO Cash Compensation, the Firm Size, the Firm Performance, and the CEO Power? To answer this question, six statistical models were created and accordingly six attestations were performed. It was found that, there was a relationship between the CEO Salary, the Firm Size, the Firm Performance, and the CEO Power; there was a relationship between the CEO Bonus and the CEO Power; and there was a relationship between the CEO Total Compensation and the Firm Size and Firm Performance. However, it was found that there was no relationship between the CEO Bonus, the Firm Size, and the Firm Performance. In addition, it was found that there was no relationship between the CEO Total Compensation and the CEO Power. The correlation between the CEO Cash Salary, the Firm Size, and the Firm Performance was positively good to strong ratios; the correlation between the CEO Salary and the CEO Power was negatively weak ratio; and the correlation between the CEO Bonus, the Firm Size, the Firm Performance, and the CEO Power was positively weak.

Suggested Citation

  • Yusuf Mohammed Nulla & Dimitris Nikolaou Koumparoulis, 2013. "CEO Compensation System in Large Canadian Financial Institutions," International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), vol. 0(1), pages 137-155.
  • Handle: RePEc:ers:ijebaa:v:i:y:2013:i:1:p:137-155
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO Compensation; Firm Performance; Firm Size; CCEO Power; Canadian Financial Institutions; Accounting Performance;

    JEL classification:

    • G0 - Financial Economics - - General
    • G19 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Other
    • G29 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Other

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