Are More Democratic Donor Countries More Development Oriented? Domestic Institutions and External Development Promotion in OECD Countries
Summary This paper reveals how political institutions within OECD countries affect those countries' foreign policies toward the developing world. For identifying the overall development orientation, the paper uses the Commitment to Development Index, which aggregates different foreign policy fields such as development assistance, trade, investment, and environmental policies according to their development orientation in poor countries. The result of regressions analysis demonstrates that the varying quality of democratic voice and accountability in 21 OECD countries explains a large part of the differences with regard to the Commitment to Development Index.These findings suggest that the existence of democratic and transparent political institutions is not only important in developing countries because they orient politicians toward the encompassing interests of society. A similar logic applies for rich countries' policies toward poor countries.
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