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Are More Democratic Donor Countries More Development Oriented? Domestic Institutions and External Development Promotion in OECD Countries

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  • Faust, Jörg

Abstract

Summary This paper reveals how political institutions within OECD countries affect those countries' foreign policies toward the developing world. For identifying the overall development orientation, the paper uses the Commitment to Development Index, which aggregates different foreign policy fields such as development assistance, trade, investment, and environmental policies according to their development orientation in poor countries. The result of regressions analysis demonstrates that the varying quality of democratic voice and accountability in 21 OECD countries explains a large part of the differences with regard to the Commitment to Development Index.These findings suggest that the existence of democratic and transparent political institutions is not only important in developing countries because they orient politicians toward the encompassing interests of society. A similar logic applies for rich countries' policies toward poor countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Faust, Jörg, 2008. "Are More Democratic Donor Countries More Development Oriented? Domestic Institutions and External Development Promotion in OECD Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 383-398, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:383-398
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    Cited by:

    1. Pickering, Jonathan & Skovgaard, Jakob & Kim, Soyeun & Roberts, J. Timmons & Rossati, David & Stadelmann, Martin & Reich, Hendrikje, 2015. "Acting on Climate Finance Pledges: Inter-Agency Dynamics and Relationships with Aid in Contributor States," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 149-162.
    2. Bodenstein, Thilo & Kemmerling, Achim, 2015. "A Paradox of Redistribution in International Aid? The Determinants of Poverty-Oriented Development Assistance," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 359-369.
    3. de Felice, Damiano, 2015. "Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality: The Role of Domestic Politics and International Socialization in French and British Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 26-45.

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