Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients
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- Knack, Stephen & Rahman, Aminur, 2007. "Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 176-197, May.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsPublic Health Promotion; Health Monitoring&Evaluation; Decentralization; Health Economics&Finance; Development Economics&Aid Effectiveness; ICT Policy and Strategies; Economic Adjustment and Lending;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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