Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Knack,Stephen & Rahman, Aminur, 2004. "Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3186, The World Bank.
References listed on IDEAS
- La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999.
"The Quality of Government,"
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, "undated". "The Quality of Government," Working Paper 19452, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Government," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1847, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Goverment," NBER Working Papers 6727, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen, 1997. "Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of Institutional Explanation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 590-602, July.
- J. Bradford De Long & Barry Eichengreen, 1991.
"The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program,"
NBER Working Papers
3899, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- DeLong, J. Bradford & Eichengreen, Barry, 1991. "The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3b1108bj, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- DeLong, J Bradford & Eichengreen, Barry, 1992. "The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program," CEPR Discussion Papers 634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- J. Bradford De Long & Barry Eichengreen, 1993. "The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Programme," J. Bradford De Long's Working Papers _109, University of California at Berkeley, Economics Department.
- J. Bradford De Long and Barry Eichengreen., 1991. "The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program," Economics Working Papers 91-184, University of California at Berkeley.
- Martens,Bertin & Mummert,Uwe & Murrell,Peter & Seabright,Paul, 2008. "The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521055390, June.
- Stephen Knack & Omar Azfar, 2003. "Trade intensity, country size and corruption," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 1-18, April.
- Swamy, Anand & Knack, Stephen & Lee, Young & Azfar, Omar, 2001.
"Gender and corruption,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 25-55, February.
- Anand V. Swamy & Stephen Knack & Young Lee & Omar Azfar, 2000. "Gender and Corruption," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-10, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- Anand Swamy & Stephen Knack & Young Lee & Omar Azfar, 2000. "Gender and Corruption," Center for Development Economics 158, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- O'Connell, Stephen A. & Soludo, Charles C., 2001. "Aid Intensity in Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(9), pages 1527-1552, September.
- Jean-Paul Azam & Shantayanan Devarajan & Stephen A. O'Connell, 1999. "Aid dependence reconsidered," CSAE Working Paper Series 1999-05, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- P. Lundborg, 1998. "Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 127-142, July.
- A. Chong & C. Calderón, 2000. "Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 69-81, March.
- Kanbur, Ravi & Sandler, Todd & Morrison, Kevin, 1999. "The Future of Development Assistance: Common Pools and International Public Goods," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1629, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- repec:fth:oxesaf:99-5 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:hrv:faseco:30747160 is not listed on IDEAS
- Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
- Brautigam, Deborah A & Knack, Stephen, 2004.
"Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa,"
Economic Development and Cultural Change,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(2), pages 255-285, January.
- Morss, Elliott R., 1984. "Institutional destruction resulting from donor and project proliferation in Sub-Saharan African countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 465-470, April.
- Stephen Knack, 2001. "Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 310-329, October.
- William Easterly, 2002. "The cartel of good intentions: The problem of bureaucracy in foreign aid," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(4), pages 223-250.
- Dale Whittington & Craig Calhoun, 1988. "Who Really Wants Donor Co‐ordination?," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 6(3), pages 295-309, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:83:y:2007:i:1:p:176-197. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Haili He). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.