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Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality: The Role of Domestic Politics and International Socialization in French and British Aid

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  • de Felice, Damiano

Abstract

This article shows that and explains why the United Kingdom has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than France. The assessment part is based on the analysis of policy documents, international agreements, and two “hard” cases (Mozambique and Zimbabwe). Variation between the two countries is explained by the existence of clearer lines of accountability for British aid decision-makers, stricter scrutiny by British media, and stronger social pressure from Nordic donors. Evidence does not support the explanatory power of material interests, party politics, level of parliamentary control, and socialization processes within the Commonwealth (versus the International Organization of La Francophonie).

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  • de Felice, Damiano, 2015. "Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality: The Role of Domestic Politics and International Socialization in French and British Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 26-45.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:75:y:2015:i:c:p:26-45
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.01.010
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    Cited by:

    1. Kohnert, Dirk, 2015. "Donor’s double talk undermines African agency: Comparative study of civic agency in Burkina Faso and Togo," EconStor Conference Papers 120921, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    2. Molenaers, Nadia & Dellepiane, Sebastian & Faust, Jorg, 2015. "Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 2-12.
    3. Del Biondo, Karen, 2015. "Donor Interests or Developmental Performance? Explaining Sanctions in EU Democracy Promotion in sub-Saharan Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 74-84.
    4. Daniela Donno & Michael Neureiter, 2018. "Can human rights conditionality reduce repression? Examining the European Union’s economic agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 335-357, September.
    5. Suzuki, Mao, 2020. "Profits before patients? Analyzing donors’ economic motives for foreign aid in the health sector," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    6. Cheeseman, Nic & Swedlund, Haley J. & O'Brien-Udry, Cleo, 2024. "Foreign aid withdrawals and suspensions: Why, when and are they effective?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    7. Dasandi, Niheer & Erez, Lior, 2023. "The flag and the stick: Aid suspensions, human rights, and the problem of the complicit public," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).

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