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Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality: The Role of Domestic Politics and International Socialization in French and British Aid

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  • de Felice, Damiano

Abstract

This article shows that and explains why the United Kingdom has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than France. The assessment part is based on the analysis of policy documents, international agreements, and two “hard” cases (Mozambique and Zimbabwe). Variation between the two countries is explained by the existence of clearer lines of accountability for British aid decision-makers, stricter scrutiny by British media, and stronger social pressure from Nordic donors. Evidence does not support the explanatory power of material interests, party politics, level of parliamentary control, and socialization processes within the Commonwealth (versus the International Organization of La Francophonie).

Suggested Citation

  • de Felice, Damiano, 2015. "Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality: The Role of Domestic Politics and International Socialization in French and British Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 26-45.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:75:y:2015:i:c:p:26-45
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.01.010
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    Cited by:

    1. Molenaers, Nadia & Dellepiane, Sebastian & Faust, Jorg, 2015. "Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 2-12.
    2. Kohnert, Dirk, 2015. "Donor’s double talk undermines African agency: Comparative study of civic agency in Burkina Faso and Togo," MPRA Paper 67093, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. repec:spr:revint:v:13:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11558-017-9283-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Del Biondo, Karen, 2015. "Donor Interests or Developmental Performance? Explaining Sanctions in EU Democracy Promotion in sub-Saharan Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 74-84.

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