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Budget Support and Democracy: a twist in the conditionality tale

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  • Rachel Hayman

Abstract

Budget support—aid delivered directly to developing country government budgets—accounts for a growing proportion of overseas development assistance. In theory it has multiple benefits over other forms of aid in terms of attaining poverty reduction and development objectives. However, recent years have seen several incidents of budget support being frozen, halted or redirected because of slippage in the democratic credentials of certain countries, including Ethiopia, Uganda, Nicaragua, Honduras, Madagascar and Rwanda. This article analyses these incidents in relation to debates over aid conditionality. It finds that donors are willing to apply political conditionality when otherwise good performing governments go politically astray, but it questions whether budget support is a viable instrument for pushing for democratic change. Co-ordinated donor action appears to be increasing, but aid flows to the countries discussed remain high and the governments in question tend to be dismissive in the face of such pressure.

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  • Rachel Hayman, 2011. "Budget Support and Democracy: a twist in the conditionality tale," Third World Quarterly, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(4), pages 673-688.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ctwqxx:v:32:y:2011:i:4:p:673-688
    DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2011.566998
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Simplice A. Asongu & Jacinta C. Nwachukwu, 2016. "Is the Threat of Foreign Aid Withdrawal an Effective Deterrent to Political Oppression? Evidence from 53 African Countries," Research Africa Network Working Papers 16/020, Research Africa Network (RAN).
    2. Molenaers, Nadia & Dellepiane, Sebastian & Faust, Jorg, 2015. "Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 2-12.
    3. Pablo Yanguas, 2016. "The role and responsibility of foreign aid in recipient political settlements," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-056-16, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    4. Roel Dom & Lionel Roger, 2018. "Economic sanctions and domestic debt: Burundi's fiscal response to the suspension of budget support," Discussion Papers 2018-12, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    5. Arjan de Haan & Ward Warmerdam, 2012. "The politics of aid revisited: a review of evidence on state capacity and elite commitment," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-007-12, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    6. Rik Habraken & Lau Schulpen & Paul Hoebink, 2017. "Putting promises into practice: The New Aid Architecture in Uganda," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 35(6), pages 779-795, November.
    7. Asongu, Simplice & Nnanna, Joseph, 2019. "Foreign aid, instability and governance in Africa," MPRA Paper 101087, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. de Felice, Damiano, 2015. "Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality: The Role of Domestic Politics and International Socialization in French and British Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 26-45.
    9. Suyeon Lee & Huck-ju Kwon, 2022. "Breaking the Negative Feedback Loop of Disaster, Conflict, and Fragility: Analyzing Development Aid by Japan and South Korea," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(16), pages 1-23, August.
    10. Fisher, Jonathan, 2015. "‘Does it Work?’ – Work for Whom? Britain and Political Conditionality since the Cold War," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 13-25.
    11. Haley J. Swedlund & Malte Lierl, 2020. "The rise and fall of budget support: Ownership, bargaining and donor commitment problems in foreign aid," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 38(S1), pages 50-69, May.
    12. Del Biondo, Karen, 2015. "Donor Interests or Developmental Performance? Explaining Sanctions in EU Democracy Promotion in sub-Saharan Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 74-84.
    13. Molenaers, N. & Gagiano, A. & Smets, L. & Dellepiane, S., 2015. "What Determines the Suspension of Budget Support?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 62-73.
    14. Geske Dijkstra, 2021. "Not such a good bargain for (the evidence on) budget support," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 39(6), pages 1031-1035, November.
    15. Mikami, Satoru & Furukawa, Mitsuaki, 2016. "Outsourced Technical Cooperation Reconsidered: Agency Problems in the Support of Decentralized Public Service Delivery in Sierra Leone," Working Papers 119, JICA Research Institute.

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