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‘Does it Work?’ – Work for Whom? Britain and Political Conditionality since the Cold War

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  • Fisher, Jonathan

Abstract

Evaluations of the political conditionality (PC) phenomenon have long focused on the question of instrumental efficacy – whether PC promotes policy reform in developing states. Evidence from the UK nevertheless suggests that this emphasis is misplaced and that donor officials increasingly use PC for ‘expressive’ reasons – to signal their putative commitment to delivering ‘value for money’ in a difficult international economic climate. This shift in rationale raises important questions; not least, what do we know about the effects of PC on public perceptions of aid and to what extent, within this dispensation, can contemporary PC be viewed as a ‘success’?

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  • Fisher, Jonathan, 2015. "‘Does it Work?’ – Work for Whom? Britain and Political Conditionality since the Cold War," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 13-25.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:75:y:2015:i:c:p:13-25
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.12.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Simon Maxwell & Roger Riddell, 1998. "Conditionality or contract: perspectives on partnership for development," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(2), pages 257-268.
    2. Tony Killick, 2004. "Politics, Evidence and the New Aid Agenda," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 22(1), pages 5-29, January.
    3. Adam, Christopher S. & Gunning, Jan Willem, 2002. "Redesigning the Aid Contract: Donors' Use of Performance Indicators in Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(12), pages 2045-2056, December.
    4. Nelson, Joan M., 1996. "Promoting policy reforms: The twilight of conditionality?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(9), pages 1551-1559, September.
    5. Adam, Christopher & Chambas, Gerard & Guillaumont, Patrick & Guillaumont Jeanneney, Sylviane & Gunning, Jan Willem, 2004. "Performance-Based Conditionality: A European Perspective," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1059-1070, June.
    6. Molenaers, Nadia & Cepinskas, Linas & Jacobs, Bert, 2010. "Budget support and policy/political dialogue: donor practices in handling (political) crises," IOB Discussion Papers 2010.06, Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy (IOB).
    7. Collier, Paul & Guillaumont, Patrick & Guillaumont, Sylviane & Gunning, Jan Willem, 1997. "Redesigning conditionality," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(9), pages 1399-1407, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Molenaers, Nadia & Dellepiane, Sebastian & Faust, Jorg, 2015. "Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 2-12.
    2. Del Biondo, Karen, 2015. "Donor Interests or Developmental Performance? Explaining Sanctions in EU Democracy Promotion in sub-Saharan Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 74-84.
    3. de Felice, Damiano, 2015. "Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality: The Role of Domestic Politics and International Socialization in French and British Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 26-45.

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