IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/devpol/v32y2014i3p299-312.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Leader, Protester, Enabler, Spoiler: Aid Strategies and Donor Politics in Institutional Assistance

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Yanguas

Abstract

type="main"> Aid co-ordination has come to be seen as a miracle cure for the ills of donor proliferation. However, in weak states where aid conditionality may be a catalyst for institutional change, the ideal of aid co-ordination is conceptually suspect, and in some instances politically counterproductive. Co-ordination is one of the two solutions to the collective-action problem that the public good of effective institutional conditionality generates; donor leadership is the other. The desirability of each solution depends on every donor's commitment and presence, which together generate a four-fold typology: leader, protester, enabler, and spoiler. As long as there is at least one enabler or spoiler donor present, aid co-ordination will be less effective than donor leadership.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Yanguas, 2014. "Leader, Protester, Enabler, Spoiler: Aid Strategies and Donor Politics in Institutional Assistance," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 32(3), pages 299-312, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:devpol:v:32:y:2014:i:3:p:299-312
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/dpr.12056
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph Wright, 2009. "How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 552-571, July.
    2. Richard Cornes, 1993. "Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(1), pages 259-271.
    3. Knack, Stephen & Rahman, Aminur, 2007. "Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 176-197, May.
    4. Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
    5. Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2007. "Weak links, good shots and other public good games: Building on BBV," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1684-1707, September.
    6. Todd Moss & Gunilla Pettersson & Nicolas van de Walle, 2006. "An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa," Working Papers 74, Center for Global Development.
    7. Axel Dreher, 2009. "IMF conditionality: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.
    8. Kanbur, Ravi & Sandler, Todd & Morrison, Kevin, 1999. "The Future of Development Assistance: Common Pools and International Public Goods," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1629, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    9. Dunning, Thad, 2004. "Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 409-423, April.
    10. Todd Sandler, 1998. "Global and regional public goods: a prognosis for collective action," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 221-247, August.
    11. Nelson, Joan M., 1996. "Promoting policy reforms: The twilight of conditionality?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(9), pages 1551-1559, September.
    12. Adam, Christopher & Chambas, Gerard & Guillaumont, Patrick & Guillaumont Jeanneney, Sylviane & Gunning, Jan Willem, 2004. "Performance-Based Conditionality: A European Perspective," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1059-1070, June.
    13. Tony Killick, 1997. "Principals, Agents And The Failings Of Conditionality," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(4), pages 483-495.
    14. Rodrik, Dani, 1989. "Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signalling," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(397), pages 756-772, September.
    15. Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
    16. Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
    17. Adam, Christopher S. & Gunning, Jan Willem, 2002. "Redesigning the Aid Contract: Donors' Use of Performance Indicators in Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(12), pages 2045-2056, December.
    18. Axel Dreher, 2004. "A Public Choice Perspective of IMF and World Bank Lending and Conditionality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 445-464, June.
    19. Collier, Paul & Guillaumont, Patrick & Guillaumont, Sylviane & Gunning, Jan Willem, 1997. "Redesigning conditionality," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(9), pages 1399-1407, September.
    20. Howard White & Oliver Morrissey, 1997. "Conditionality When Donor And Recipient Preferences Vary," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(4), pages 497-505.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Harendt & Heinemann. Friedrich & Stefani Weiss, 2018. "Why and How There Should be More Europe in Development Policy," EconPol Policy Brief 09, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    2. Pablo Yanguas, 2016. "The role and responsibility of foreign aid in recipient political settlements," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-056-16, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    3. Michael Chasukwa & Dan Banik, 2019. "Bypassing Government: Aid Effectiveness and Malawi’s Local Development Fund," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 7(2), pages 103-116.
    4. Yanguas, Pablo & Hulme, David, 2015. "Barriers to Political Analysis in Aid Bureaucracies: From Principle to Practice in DFID and the World Bank," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 209-219.
    5. Christoph Harendt & Heinemann. Friedrich & Stefani Weiss, 2018. "Why and How There Should be More Europe in Development Policy," EconPol Policy Brief 9, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    6. Matthew Dornan, 2017. "How new is the ‘new’ conditionality? Recipient perspectives on aid, country ownership and policy reform," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 35, pages 46-63, July.
    7. Michael Chasukwa & Dan Banik, 2019. "Institutional bypass and aid effectiveness in Africa," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2019-22, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Elisabeth Paul, 2006. "A Survey of the Theoretical Economic Literature on Foreign Aid," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 20(1), pages 1-17, May.
    2. Temple, Jonathan R.W., 2010. "Aid and Conditionality," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4415-4523, Elsevier.
    3. Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg, 2014. "Group efforts when performance is determined by the “best shot”," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 333-373, June.
    4. Pablo Yanguas, 2016. "The role and responsibility of foreign aid in recipient political settlements," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-056-16, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    5. Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2020. "Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 555-582, June.
    6. Alessandra Cepparulo & Luisa Giuriato, 2012. "Global Challenges and Country-Specific Responses through Aid Financing of Global Public Goods," Working Papers in Public Economics 156, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
    7. Angelika J. Budjan & Andreas Fuchs, 2021. "Democracy and Aid Donorship," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 217-238, November.
    8. Öhler, Hannes & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Dreher, Axel, 2012. "Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 138-153.
    9. Guillaume Cheikbossian, 2016. "The political economy of (De)centralization with complementary public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 315-348, August.
    10. Ariel Akerman & João Paulo Pessoa & Leonardo Weller, 2022. "The West’s Teeth: IMF conditionality during the Cold War," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(7), pages 2034-2051, July.
    11. Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2007. "Weak links, good shots and other public good games: Building on BBV," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1684-1707, September.
    12. Jones, Sam & Tarp, Finn, 2016. "Does foreign aid harm political institutions?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 266-281.
    13. Molenaers, Nadia & Dellepiane, Sebastian & Faust, Jorg, 2015. "Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 2-12.
    14. Fisher, Jonathan, 2015. "‘Does it Work?’ – Work for Whom? Britain and Political Conditionality since the Cold War," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 13-25.
    15. Hielscher, Stefan & Pies, Ingo, 2005. "Internationale öffentliche Güter: Ein neues Paradigma der Entwicklungspolitik?," Discussion Papers 2005-5, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    16. Jones, Sam & Tarp, Finn, 2016. "Does foreign aid harm political institutions?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 266-281.
    17. Oliveira Cruz, Valeria & McPake, Barbara, 2010. "The "aid contract" and its compensation scheme: A case study of the performance of the Ugandan health sector," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 71(7), pages 1357-1365, October.
    18. Sandler, Todd, 2001. "On financing global and international public goods," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2638, The World Bank.
    19. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Attack-and-Defence Group Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 049, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    20. Balázs Szent-Iványi, 2015. "Are Democratising Countries Rewarded with Higher Levels of Foreign Aid?," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 65(4), pages 593-615, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:devpol:v:32:y:2014:i:3:p:299-312. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/odioruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.