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It’s Domestic Politics, Stupid! EU Democracy Promotion Strategies Meet African Dominant Party Regimes

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  • Hackenesch, Christine
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    Dominant party systems trigger controversy about how the EU should engage with them. The examples of Ethiopia and Rwanda show that the willingness of authoritarian governments to engage with the EU on democratic reforms varies widely. The paper argues that the type of challenge to regime survival that authoritarian governments face affects both their coercive strategies and their openness to engaging with the EU, giving the EU different entry points to support reforms. Yet, due to EU domestic factors and difficulties with ‘reading’ authoritarian regimes’ logic of political survival, the EU has problems making use of this dynamic.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.

    Volume (Year): 75 (2015)
    Issue (Month): C ()
    Pages: 85-96

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:75:y:2015:i:c:p:85-96
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.04.002
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    1. Molenaers, Nadia & Dellepiane, Sebastian & Faust, Jorg, 2015. "Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 2-12.
    2. Stefaan Marysse & An Ansoms & Danny Cassimon, 2007. "The Aid 'Darlings' and 'Orphans' of the Great Lakes Region in Africa," The European Journal of Development Research, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 19(3), pages 433-458.
    3. Ronald Wintrobe, 2001. "How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economist's view," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 35-58, 03.
    4. Nadia Molenaers & Leen Nijs, 2009. "From the Theory of Aid Effectiveness to the Practice: The European Commission's Governance Incentive Tranche," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 27(5), pages 561-580, September.
    5. Reuter, Ora John & Gandhi, Jennifer, 2011. "Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(01), pages 83-110, January.
    6. Medhane Tadesse & John Young, 2003. "TPLF: reform or decline?," Review of African Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(97), pages 389-403, September.
    7. Tony Killick, 1997. "Principals, Agents And The Failings Of Conditionality," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(4), pages 483-495.
    8. Koch, Svea, 2015. "A Typology of Political Conditionality Beyond Aid: Conceptual Horizons Based on Lessons from the European Union," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 97-108.
    9. Sue Unsworth, 2009. "What's politics got to do with it?: Why donors find it so hard to come to terms with politics, and why this matters," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 883-894.
    10. Lars-Christopher Huening, 2013. "Making use of the past: the Rwandophone question and the ‘Balkanisation of the Congo’," Review of African Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(135), pages 13-31, March.
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