IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/streco/v65y2023icp273-285.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The rise of contract-intensive economic structures and democratic development: Are they related?

Author

Listed:
  • Mousseau, Michael
  • Mousseau, Demet Yalcin

Abstract

Does the rise of contract-intensive economic structures in an economy affect political norms and promote democracy? In this study we delineate how the economic structures of commercial contracting can yield the interests, values, and outlooks that favor the democratic rule of law for the enforcement of contracts. Analyses of most countries from 1950 to 2019 show that the increase in the intensity of contract flows has a significant impact on democracy. The results are robust across a range of specifications, measures, control variables, and with instrumental variable regression to check for reverse causality. A change from the tenth to ninetieth percentile in the institutionalization of commercial contracting corresponds with a substantial 58 to 105% increase in local average treatment effect (LATE) on democracy in the long run, depending on the measures examined.

Suggested Citation

  • Mousseau, Michael & Mousseau, Demet Yalcin, 2023. "The rise of contract-intensive economic structures and democratic development: Are they related?," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 273-285.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:streco:v:65:y:2023:i:c:p:273-285
    DOI: 10.1016/j.strueco.2023.02.017
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0954349X23000309
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.strueco.2023.02.017?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert C. Feenstra & Robert Inklaar & Marcel P. Timmer, 2015. "The Next Generation of the Penn World Table," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(10), pages 3150-3182, October.
    2. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast*, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
    3. Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 857-882, December.
    4. Bat Batjargal, 2007. "Network triads: transitivity, referral and venture capital decisions in China and Russia," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 38(6), pages 998-1012, November.
    5. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson & Pierre Yared, 2008. "Income and Democracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 808-842, June.
    6. Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Gerard Roland, 2021. "Culture, institutions and democratization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(1), pages 165-195, April.
    7. Cihak, Martin & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Feyen, Erik & Levine, Ross, 2012. "Benchmarking financial systems around the world," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6175, The World Bank.
    8. Christopher Claassen, 2020. "Does Public Support Help Democracy Survive?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(1), pages 118-134, January.
    9. Lemarchand, René, 1972. "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa:* Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 68-90, March.
    10. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A. & Yared, Pierre, 2009. "Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1043-1058, November.
    11. Martin Gassebner & Michael J. Lamla & James Raymond Vreeland, 2013. "Extreme Bounds of Democracy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 57(2), pages 171-197, April.
    12. Meierrieks Daniel, 2012. "Rooted in Urban Poverty? Failed Modernization and Terrorism," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 1-2, December.
    13. Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 830-851, September.
    14. Humberto Llavador & Robert J. Oxoby, 2005. "Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(3), pages 1155-1189.
    15. Philip Keefer, 2007. "Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(4), pages 804-821, October.
    16. Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Stanley L. Engerman, 2000. "Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 217-232, Summer.
    17. Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2015. "The rise of capitalism and the roots of anti-American terrorism," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 52(1), pages 46-61, January.
    18. Jason Enia & Patrick James, 2015. "Regime Type, Peace, and Reciprocal Effects," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 96(2), pages 523-539, June.
    19. Clague, Christopher & Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen & Olson, Mancur, 1999. "Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 185-211, June.
    20. Thorin M. Wright & Shweta Moorthy, 2018. "Refugees, Economic Capacity, and Host State Repression," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(1), pages 132-155, January.
    21. Guido Tabellini, 2008. "Presidential Address Institutions and Culture," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 255-294, 04-05.
    22. Sherry, John F, Jr, 1983. "Gift Giving in Anthropological Perspective," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 10(2), pages 157-168, September.
    23. Kuran, Timur, 1987. "Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conservatism," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 642-665, September.
    24. Espen Geelmuyden Rød & Carl Henrik Knutsen & Håvard Hegre, 2020. "The determinants of democracy: a sensitivity analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 87-111, October.
    25. Nikolova, Elena, 2017. "Destined for Democracy? Labour Markets and Political Change in Colonial British America," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 19-45, January.
    26. Thorsten Beck & Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Ross Levine, 2010. "Financial Institutions and Markets across Countries and over Time: The Updated Financial Development and Structure Database," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 24(1), pages 77-92, January.
    27. Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2004. "Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 707-765.
    28. Daniel McCarthy & Sheila Puffer & Denise Dunlap & Alfred Jaeger, 2012. "A Stakeholder Approach to the Ethicality of BRIC-firm Managers’ Use of Favors," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 27-38, August.
    29. Lipset, Seymour Martin, 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy1," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 69-105, March.
    30. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
    31. HÃ¥vard Hegre & Michael Bernhard & Jan Teorell, 2020. "Civil Society and the Democratic Peace," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 64(1), pages 32-62, January.
    32. Burkhart, Ross E. & Lewis-Beck, Michael S., 1994. "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(4), pages 903-910, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Robert K. Fleck & F. Andrew Hanssen, 2018. "Path dependence and transitions from tyranny to democracy: evidence from ancient Greece," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 371-388, December.
    2. Mara Squicciarini & Nico Voigtländer, 2016. "Knowledge elites and modernization: evidence from revolutionary France," Working Papers of LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance 569653, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance.
    3. Sunde, Uwe & Jung, Florian, 2011. "Inequality, Development, and the Stability of Democracy -Lipset and Three Critical Junctures in German History," CEPR Discussion Papers 8406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Nikolova, Elena & Nikolova, Milena, 2017. "Suffrage, labour markets and coalitions in colonial Virginia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 108-122.
    5. Cervellati Matteo & Fortunato Piergiuseppe & Sunde Uwe, 2012. "Consensual and Conflictual Democratization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-51, December.
    6. Gründler, Klaus & Krieger, Tommy, 2016. "Democracy and growth: Evidence from a machine learning indicator," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(S), pages 85-107.
    7. Erich Gundlach & Martin Paldam, 2016. "Socioeconomic transitions as common dynamic processes," Economics Working Papers 2016-06, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    8. Daron Acemoglu & Suresh Naidu & Pascual Restrepo & James A. Robinson, 2019. "Democracy Does Cause Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(1), pages 47-100.
    9. Natkhov, T. & Polishchuk, L., 2017. "Political Economy of Institutions and Development: The Importance of Being Inclusive. Reflection on "Why Nations Fail" by D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson. Part I. Institutions and Economic Devel," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 12-38.
    10. Sunde, Uwe & Fortunato, Piergiuseppe & Cervellati, Matteo, 2011. "Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of Violence During the Transition," CEPR Discussion Papers 8315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Jung, Florian & Sunde, Uwe, 2014. "Income, inequality, and the stability of democracy — Another look at the Lipset hypothesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 52-74.
    12. Aidt, Toke S. & Jensen, Peter S., 2014. "Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820–1938," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 52-75.
    13. Espen Geelmuyden Rød & Carl Henrik Knutsen & Håvard Hegre, 2020. "The determinants of democracy: a sensitivity analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 87-111, October.
    14. Roland Hodler, 2018. "The Political Economics Of The Arab Spring," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 821-836, April.
    15. Marino, Maria & Donni, Paolo Li & Bavetta, Sebastiano & Cellini, Marco, 2020. "The democratization process: An empirical appraisal of the role of political protest," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    16. Ghosal, Sayantan & Proto, Eugenio, 2009. "Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1078-1089, October.
    17. Gutmann, Jerg & Voigt, Stefan, 2018. "The rule of law: Measurement and deep roots," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 68-82.
    18. BenYishay, Ariel & Betancourt, Roger, 2014. "Unbundling democracy: Political rights and civil liberties," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 552-568.
    19. Uwe Sunde, 2006. "Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Demokratie – Ist Demokratie ein Wohlstandsmotor oder ein Wohlstandsprodukt?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(4), pages 471-499, November.
    20. Mousseau Michael, 2019. "Four Ways We Know the Democratic Peace Correlation Does Not Exist in the State of Knowledge," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 25(4), pages 1-8, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:streco:v:65:y:2023:i:c:p:273-285. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/525148 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.