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Pupil mobility and school disruption

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  • Gibbons, Stephen
  • Telhaj, Shqiponja

Abstract

Pupil mobility between schools is something to be encouraged if it facilitates the efficient matching of pupils to provision, but discouraged if turnover imposes costs on other pupils through disruption in teaching and learning. With this in mind, we consider the externalities imposed by entrants on the achievements of incumbent pupils in English primary schools. We find that immobile pupils who experience high pupil entry rates in their yeargroups (à la US "grades") progress less well academically between ages 7 and 11 than pupils who experience low mobility in the same school. The disruptive externalities of mobility are statistically significant, but quite small in terms of their educational impact. An increase in annual entry rates from 0 to 10% (a 4 standard deviation change) would set the average incumbent pupil back by between 1 and 2Â weeks, or about 5% of one standard deviation of the gain in pupil achievement between ages 7 and 11.

Suggested Citation

  • Gibbons, Stephen & Telhaj, Shqiponja, 2011. "Pupil mobility and school disruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(9-10), pages 1156-1167, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:9-10:p:1156-1167
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    Cited by:

    1. Gibbons, Stephen & Silva, Olmo & Weinhardt, Felix, 2014. "Neighbourhood Turnover and Teenage Attainment," IZA Discussion Papers 8381, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Zhang, Hongliang, 2016. "The role of testing noise in the estimation of achievement-based peer effects," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 113-123.
    3. Kristoffersen, Jannie Helene Grøne & Krægpøth, Morten Visby & Nielsen, Helena Skyt & Simonsen, Marianne, 2015. "Disruptive school peers and student outcomes," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-13.
    4. Figlio, D. & Karbownik, K. & Salvanes, K.G., 2016. "Education Research and Administrative Data," Handbook of the Economics of Education, Elsevier.
    5. Stephen Gibbons & Sandra McNally, 2013. "The Effects of Resources Across School Phases: A Summary of Recent Evidence," CEP Discussion Papers dp1226, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mobility Student achievement Externalities;

    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
    • R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics
    • J - Labor and Demographic Economics

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