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A political economy analysis of preferential public procurement policies

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  • Mougeot, Michel
  • Naegelen, Florence

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  • Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2005. "A political economy analysis of preferential public procurement policies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 483-501, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:21:y:2005:i:2:p:483-501
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    1. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1981. "Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 14(3), pages 371-389, August.
    2. Federico Trionfetti, 2000. "Discriminatory Public Procurement and International Trade," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 57-76, January.
    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1996. "Industrial policy and politics," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-27.
    4. Snow, Arthur & Warren, Ronald Jr., 1996. "The marginal welfare cost of public funds: Theory and estimates," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 289-305, August.
    5. Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1999. "Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(1), pages 137-157, Spring.
    6. Naegelen, Florence & Mougeot, Michel, 1998. "Discriminatory public procurement policy and cost reduction incentives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 349-367, March.
    7. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1989. "Government procurement and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 291-308, May.
    8. Branco, Fernando, 1994. "Favoring domestic firms in procurement contracts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1-2), pages 65-80, August.
    9. Vagstad, Steinar, 1995. "Promoting fair competition in public procurement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 283-307, October.
    10. Ballard, Charles L & Shoven, John B & Whalley, John, 1985. "General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 128-138, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Long, Ngo Van & Stähler, Frank, 2009. "A contest model of liberalizing government procurements," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 479-488, December.
    2. Jiancai Pi, 2021. "An investigation of seeming favoritism in public procurement," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(1), pages 128-137, January.
    3. Štěpán Veselý & Mirko Dohnal, 2012. "Decision making in goverment tenders: A formalized qualitative model," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 397-406.
    4. Karl Hackenbrack & Mikhael Shor, 2012. "Auditor Preference," Working papers 2012-20, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

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