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Phasing out the GSEs

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  • Elenev, Vadim
  • Landvoigt, Tim
  • Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn

Abstract

We develop a new model of the mortgage market that emphasizes the role of the financial sector and the government. Risk tolerant savers act as intermediaries between risk averse depositors and impatient borrowers. Both borrowers and intermediaries can default. The government provides both mortgage guarantees and deposit insurance. Underpriced government mortgage guarantees lead to more and riskier mortgage originations and higher financial sector leverage. Mortgage crises occasionally turn into financial crises and government bailouts due to the fragility of the intermediaries’ balance sheets. Foreclosure crises beget fiscal uncertainty, further disrupting the optimal allocation of risk in the economy. Increasing the price of the mortgage guarantee “crowds in” the private sector, reduces financial fragility, leads to fewer but safer mortgages, lowers house prices, and raises mortgage and risk-free interest rates. Due to a more robust financial sector and less fiscal uncertainty, consumption smoothing improves and foreclosure rates fall. While borrowers are nearly indifferent to a world with or without mortgage guarantees, savers are substantially better off. While aggregate welfare increases, so does wealth inequality.

Suggested Citation

  • Elenev, Vadim & Landvoigt, Tim & Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn, 2016. "Phasing out the GSEs," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 111-132.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:81:y:2016:i:c:p:111-132
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.06.003
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:dyncon:v:87:y:2018:i:c:p:124-151 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Gete, Pedro & Zecchetto, Franco, 2017. "Distributional Implications of Government Guarantees in Mortgage Markets," MPRA Paper 80643, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Brzoza-Brzezina, Michał & Kolasa, Marcin & Makarski, Krzysztof, 2017. "Monetary and macroprudential policy with foreign currency loans," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 54(PB), pages 352-372.
    4. Marcin Kolasa, 2016. "Equilibrium foreign currency mortgages," Working Papers 2016-021, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis.
    5. Paolo Sodini & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Roine Vestman & Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal, 2016. "Identifying the Benefits from Home Ownership: A Swedish Experiment," NBER Working Papers 22882, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Erik Hurst & Benjamin J. Keys & Amit Seru & Joseph Vavra, 2016. "Regional Redistribution through the US Mortgage Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(10), pages 2982-3028, October.
    7. Tim Landvoigt & Juliane Begenau, 2016. "Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System," 2016 Meeting Papers 1462, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Zhao, Yunhui, 2016. "Got Hurt for What You Paid? Revisiting Government Subsidy in the U.S. Mortgage Market," MPRA Paper 81083, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Aug 2017.
    9. Yoo, Jinhyuk, 2017. "Capital injection to banks versus debt relief to households," IMFS Working Paper Series 111, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    10. Silvo, Aino, 2017. "House prices, lending standards, and the macroeconomy," Research Discussion Papers 4/2017, Bank of Finland.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial intermediation; Housing policy; Government bailouts;

    JEL classification:

    • E0 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • G00 - Financial Economics - - General - - - General
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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