IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/labeco/v43y2016icp122-128.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Profiting from presenteeism? Effects of an enforced activation policy on firm profits

Author

Listed:
  • Godøy, Anna

Abstract

Activation requirements and graded benefits are strategies for reducing social insurance costs in comprehensive welfare states. In Norway, a policy of issuing graded rather than full time sickness absence certificates, is viewed as a strategy not just to reduce direct costs of sick pay but also to facilitate returns to work and reduce inflows to permanent disability. This paper analyzes effects of graded sick leave on firm profits, on average and across different firm groups. A series of panel data models are formulated to estimate the effects of grading on firm profits. In these models, grading is found to mitigate the negative effects of sickness absence on firm profit. A one percentage point increase in full time sickness absence leads to a 1.7% reduction in return on assets relative to the sample mean; this negative effect is reduced by 70% when absence is graded. Effects are robust to inclusion of firm fixed effects as well as time-varying proxies for labor demand.

Suggested Citation

  • Godøy, Anna, 2016. "Profiting from presenteeism? Effects of an enforced activation policy on firm profits," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 122-128.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:43:y:2016:i:c:p:122-128
    DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2016.06.012
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927537116300641
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Harald Dale-Olsen & Pål Schøne & Mette Verner, 2013. "Diversity among Norwegian Boards of Directors: Does a Quota for Women Improve Firm Performance?," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 110-135, October.
    2. Sean Nicholson & Mark V. Pauly & Daniel Polsky & Claire Sharda & Helena Szrek & Marc L. Berger, 2006. "Measuring the effects of work loss on productivity with team production," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(2), pages 111-123.
    3. Høgelund, Jan & Holm, Anders & McIntosh, James, 2010. "Does graded return-to-work improve sick-listed workers' chance of returning to regular working hours?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 158-169, January.
    4. Elisabeth Fevang & Simen Markussen & Knut Røed, 2014. "The Sick Pay Trap," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages 305-336.
    5. Berglann, Helge & Moen, Espen R. & Røed, Knut & Skogstrøm, Jens Fredrik, 2011. "Entrepreneurship: Origins and returns," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 180-193, April.
    6. Mark V. Pauly & Sean Nicholson & Judy Xu & Dan Polsky & Patricia M. Danzon & James F. Murray & Marc L. Berger, 2002. "A general model of the impact of absenteeism on employers and employees," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 11(3), pages 221-231.
    7. Markussen, Simen & Mykletun, Arnstein & Røed, Knut, 2012. "The case for presenteeism — Evidence from Norway's sickness insurance program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 959-972.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Absenteeism; Productivity; Activation; Work loss;

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
    • J48 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Particular Labor Markets; Public Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:43:y:2016:i:c:p:122-128. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/labeco .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.