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Performance fee contract change and mutual fund risk

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  • Golec, Joseph
  • Starks, Laura

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  • Golec, Joseph & Starks, Laura, 2004. "Performance fee contract change and mutual fund risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 93-118, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:73:y:2004:i:1:p:93-118
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December.
    2. Joseph H. Golec, 1993. "The Effects of Incentive Compensation Contracts on the Risk and Return Performance of Commodity Trading Advisors," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(11), pages 1396-1406, November.
    3. Huddart, Steven, 1999. "Reputation and performance fee effects on portfolio choice by investment advisers1," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 227-271, August.
    4. Larcker, David F., 1983. "The association between performance plan adoption and corporate capital investment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-30, April.
    5. Jennifer Lynch Koski & Jeffrey Pontiff, 1999. "How Are Derivatives Used? Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 791-816, April.
    6. Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
    7. Mark Grinblatt & Sheridan Titman, 1989. "Adverse Risk Incentives and the Design of Performance-Based Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 807-822.
    8. Susan I. Cohen & Laura T. Starks, 1988. "Estimation Risk and Incentive Contracts for Portfolio Managers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(9), pages 1067-1079, September.
    9. Deli, Daniel N. & Varma, Raj, 2002. "Contracting in the investment management industry: *1: evidence from mutual funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 79-98, January.
    10. Bizjak, John M. & Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L., 1993. "Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 349-372, April.
    11. Anthony W. Lynch & David K. Musto, 1997. "Understanding Fee Structures in the Asset Management Business," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 98-050, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
    12. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 225-264.
    13. Healy, Paul M. & Kang, Sok-Hyon & Palepu, Krishna G., 1987. "The effect of accounting procedure changes on CEOs' cash salary and bonus compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 7-34, April.
    14. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
    15. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-1156.
    16. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    17. Heinkel, Robert & Stoughton, Neal M, 1994. "The Dynamics of Portfolio Management Contracts," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(2), pages 351-387.
    18. Fung, William & Hsieh, David A., 1999. "A primer on hedge funds," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 309-331, September.
    19. Golec, Joseph H., 1992. "Empirical Tests of a Principal-Agent Model of the Investor-Investment Advisor Relationship," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(01), pages 81-95, March.
    20. Jeffrey L. Coles & Jose Suay & Denise Woodbury, 2000. "Fund Advisor Compensation in Closed-End Funds," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(3), pages 1385-1414, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:empfin:v:44:y:2017:i:c:p:91-107 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Joanne K. Yoong & Angela Hung, 2009. "Self-Dealing and Compensation for Financial Advisors," Working Papers 713, RAND Corporation.
    3. Kempf, Alexander & Ruenzi, Stefan & Thiele, Tanja, 2009. "Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 92-108, April.
    4. Gallaher, Steven & Kaniel, Ron & Starks, Laura T, 2015. "Advertising and Mutual Funds: From Families to Individual Funds," CEPR Discussion Papers 10329, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Glode, Vincent, 2011. "Why mutual funds "underperform"," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 546-559, March.
    6. Cashman, George D. & Deli, Daniel N., 2009. "Locating decision rights: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 645-671, November.
    7. Agarwal, Vikas & Gómez, Juan-Pedro & Priestley, Richard, 2012. "Management compensation and market timing under portfolio constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 1600-1625.
    8. João Paulo Vieito & António Cerqueira & Elísio Brandão & Walayet A. Khan, 2009. "Executive Compensation: the Finance Perspective," Portuguese Journal of Management Studies, ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, vol. 0(1), pages 3-32.
    9. Zhen Shi, 2011. "The Impact of Portfolio Disclosure on Hedge Fund Performance, Fees and Flows," NFI Working Papers 2011-WP-07, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    10. Yoshikatsu Shinozawa, 2007. "The Effect of Organisational Form on Investment Products: an empirical analysis of the UK unit trust industry," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(6), pages 1244-1259, November.
    11. Giambona, Erasmo & Golec, Joseph, 2009. "Mutual fund volatility timing and management fees," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 589-599, April.
    12. Cashman, George D., 2010. "Pay-performance sensitivity and firm size: Insights from the mutual fund industry," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 400-412, September.
    13. Cécile Moigne & Patrick Savaria, 2006. "Relative importance of hedge fund characteristics," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 20(4), pages 419-441, December.

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