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Voluntary contributions to reduce expected public losses


  • Keser, Claudia
  • Montmarquette, Claude


We examine voluntary private contributions to reduce the probability of a public loss in the experimental economics laboratory. In several treatments, we examine how loss probability, initial wealth and ambiguity affect the contribution level. We observe that, in contrast to the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium, participants do make positive contributions although the contribution level is lower than in the typical experiments on voluntary contributions to fund public goods. Reciprocity plays an important role in individual decision-making. The occurrence of a loss decreases the aggregate contribution level.

Suggested Citation

  • Keser, Claudia & Montmarquette, Claude, 2008. "Voluntary contributions to reduce expected public losses," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 477-491, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:66:y:2008:i:3-4:p:477-491

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nathalie Colombier & David Masclet & Daniel Mirza & Claude Montmarquette, 2011. "Global Security Policies against Terrorism and the Free Riding Problem: An Experimental Approach," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 755-790, October.
    2. Claude Montmarquette, 2008. "L'économétrie des données expérimentales : défis et opportunités," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(1), pages 7-17.
    3. Malcolm Kass & Enrique Fatas & Catherine Eckel & Daniel Arce, 2015. "The UN in the lab," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(3), pages 625-651, October.
    4. Nicklisch, Andreas & Köke, Sonja & Lange, Andreas, 2016. "Is Adversity a School of Wisdom? Experimental Evidence on Cooperative Protection Against Stochastic Losses," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145716, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Nora Vogt, 2015. "Environmental Risk Negatively Impacts Trust and Reciprocity in Conservation Contracts: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(3), pages 417-431, November.
    6. repec:eee:ecolec:v:144:y:2018:i:c:p:36-58 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Claudia Keser & Gerrit Kimpel & Andreas Oestreicher, 2016. "Would a CCCTB mitigate profit shifting?," CIRANO Working Papers 2016s-29, CIRANO.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H49 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Other
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior


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