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Theoretical Explanations of Treatment Effects in Voluntary Contributions Experiments


  • Holt, Charles A.
  • Laury, Susan K.


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  • Holt, Charles A. & Laury, Susan K., 2008. "Theoretical Explanations of Treatment Effects in Voluntary Contributions Experiments," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:expchp:6-90

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211.
    2. Warr, Peter G., 1982. "Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 131-138, October.
    3. Andreoni, James, 1993. "An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1317-1327, December.
    4. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    5. Kenneth S. Chan & Stuart Mestelman & Rob Moir & R. Andrew Muller Moir, 1996. "The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods under Varying Income Distributions," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(1), pages 54-69, February.
    6. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
    7. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1986. "On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 789-793, September.
    8. Clotfelter, Charles T., 1985. "Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226110486.
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    Cited by:

    1. Snir, Avichai, 2014. "When choosing to be almost certain of winning can be better than choosing to win with certainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 135-146.
    2. Dmitry Shapiro, 2009. "The role of utility interdependence in public good experiments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 81-106, March.
    3. Gronberg, Timothy J. & Luccasen, R. Andrew & Turocy, Theodore L. & Van Huyck, John B., 2012. "Are tax-financed contributions to a public good completely crowded-out? Experimental evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(7-8), pages 596-603.
    4. Marianna Baggio & Luigi Mittone, 2016. "Experience and History: An Experimental Approach to Generational Heterogeneity," International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics (IJABE), IGI Global, vol. 5(4), pages 1-23, October.
    5. Claudia Keser & Claude Montmarquette, 2004. "Voluntary Teaming and Effort," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-49, CIRANO.
    6. Lugovskyy, Volodymyr & Puzzello, Daniela & Sorensen, Andrea & Walker, James & Williams, Arlington, 2017. "An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 286-302.
    7. Keser, Claudia & Montmarquette, Claude, 2008. "Voluntary contributions to reduce expected public losses," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 477-491, June.
    8. Marc Willinger & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2001. "Strength of the Social Dilemma in a Public Goods Experiment: An Exploration of the Error Hypothesis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(2), pages 131-144, October.
    9. Andres Reeson & John Tisdell, 2007. "Markets, Motivations And Public Goods: Experimental Investigations On The Impact Of Institutions," Monash Economics Working Papers 22-07, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    10. Jeannette Brosig & Joachim Weimann & Axel Ockenfels, 2003. "The Effect of Communication Media on Cooperation," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 4(2), pages 217-241, May.
    11. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 1999. "Altruism and Noisy Behavior in One-Shot Public Goods Experiments," Virginia Economics Online Papers 331, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
    12. Reeson, Andrew F. & Tisdell, John G., 2008. "Institutions, motivations and public goods: An experimental test of motivational crowding," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 273-281, October.
    13. Simon P Anderson & Jacob K Goeree & Charles A Holt, 2001. "A Thoeretical Anlysis of Altruism and Decision Error in Public Goods Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000075, David K. Levine.
    14. Marianna Baggio & Luigi Mittone, 2015. "Grandparents Matter: Perspectives on Intergenerational Altruism. An Experiment on Family Dynamic Spillovers in Public Goods Games," CEEL Working Papers 1502, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    15. Boyle, Kevin J. & Morrison, Mark & Taylor, Laura O., 2004. "Why Value Estimates Generated Using Choice Modelling Exceed Contingent Valuation: Further Experimental Evidence," 2004 Conference (48th), February 11-13, 2004, Melbourne, Australia 58370, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.

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    JEL classification:

    • C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods


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