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All-pay contests with unordered cost asymmetry: An experimental study

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  • Riyanto, Yohanes E.
  • Yang, Siqiang
  • Zhu, Feng

Abstract

This paper presents a laboratory experiment investigating contest design and contestant behavior in settings where participants have different cost functions and regions of advantage, a topic that is relatively unexplored. Utilizing lab experiments based on Siegel’s (2009, 2010) models, we discover that bidding strategies and payoffs largely follow theoretical predictions. The weakest contestants tend to over-participate due to their cost advantage in low-bid regions. Adding a prize or increasing the prize value benefits stronger participants and increases the designer’s revenue. While decreasing the number of contestants also favors stronger participants, the designer’s revenue decrease in response.

Suggested Citation

  • Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Yang, Siqiang & Zhu, Feng, 2025. "All-pay contests with unordered cost asymmetry: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:236:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125002501
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107131
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    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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