Duopolistic competition between independent and collaborative business-to-business marketplaces
This paper studies imperfect price competition between two intermediaries in an electronic business-to-business matching market with indirect network externalities. The intermediaries have different ownership structures: an independent incumbent competes with a collaborative buy side consortium to attract buying and selling firms. When firms can register exclusively with one intermediary, the incumbent can deter entry only if the number of consortium owners is sufficiently small. Otherwise, the consortium can enter and monopolize the market. When firms can register with both intermediaries simultaneously, the consortium can always enter and both intermediaries stay in the market with positive profits.
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