Quantity competition with access fees
We analyze an oligopoly model where firms choose both quantities and access fees. Per unit prices are determined endogenously to equate quantity demanded with quantity supplied at each firm. In a Nash equilibrium of the game played by firms, the per unit prices equal mairginal cost and access fees may or may not extract all consumer surplus.
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