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Consumers’ response to weak unique selling propositions: Implications for optimal product recommendation strategy

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  • Caldieraro, Fabio
  • Cunha, Marcus

Abstract

We use a multi-method approach (analytical model and behavioral experiment) to investigate product recommendations based on less-important attributes (weak unique selling proposition, USP). We consider multiple scenarios in which a recommender’s level of expertise (knowledge about product attributes and their importance) and bias (preference for the firm as opposed to consumers) operate as cues for consumers to evaluate the recommender’s message.

Suggested Citation

  • Caldieraro, Fabio & Cunha, Marcus, 2022. "Consumers’ response to weak unique selling propositions: Implications for optimal product recommendation strategy," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 724-744.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ijrema:v:39:y:2022:i:3:p:724-744
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijresmar.2021.11.003
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