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Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation

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  • Kugler, Tamar
  • Neeman, Zvika
  • Vulkan, Nir

Abstract

We consider the consequences of competition between two types of experimental exchange mechanisms, a “decentralized bargaining” market, and a “centralized” market. The experiment demonstrates that decentralized bargaining is subject to a process of unraveling in which relatively weak traders (buyers with high willingness to pay and sellers with low costs) continuously find trading in the centralized market more attractive until almost no opportunities for mutually beneficial trade remain outside the centralized marketplace.
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Suggested Citation

  • Kugler, Tamar & Neeman, Zvika & Vulkan, Nir, 2006. "Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 121-134, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:56:y:2006:i:1:p:121-134
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2015. "Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(2), pages 203-241, October.
    2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Georg Kirchsteiger & Markus Walzl, 2010. "On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(543), pages 215-243, March.
    3. Neeman Zvika & Vulkan Nir, 2010. "Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-30, February.
    4. Jianjun Miao, 2006. "A search model of centralized and decentralized trade," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(1), pages 68-92, January.
    5. Arthur Schram & Jordi Brandts & Klarita Gërxhani, 2007. "Information Networks and Worker Recruitment," Working Papers 316, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    6. Olga A. Rud & Jean Paul Rabanal & Manizha Sharifova, 2018. "An experiment on the efficiency of bilateral exchange under incomplete markets," Working Papers 123, Peruvian Economic Association.
    7. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Walzl, Markus, 2006. "On the Evolution of Trading Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    8. Simon Loertscher, 2008. "MARKET MAKING OLIGOPOLY -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 263-289, June.
    9. Jean Paul Rabanal & Olga A. Rabanal, 2015. "A Simulation on the Evolution of Markets: Call Market, Decentralized and Posted Offer," Working Papers 2015-34, Peruvian Economic Association.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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