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Ratio controls need reconsideration

Author

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  • Goodhart, Charles

Abstract

Bank equity capital can play several roles; for example as a buffer against (unexpected) loss, as protection for other creditors in bankruptcy, and as ‘skin in the game’. There was never sufficient discussion of which role(s) the BCBS capital adequacy requirements (CARs) were meant to play, and whether they did so satisfactorily. In practice they did not. I discuss what principles should lie behind CARs if we could design these from scratch. I argue that there should be a minimum intervention point triggering official action to depose management and shareholders, and then move to resolution, with an increasingly penal ladder of sanctions as equity capital falls towards this point. A similar approach should also be applied to liquidity requirements.

Suggested Citation

  • Goodhart, Charles, 2013. "Ratio controls need reconsideration," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 445-450.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:9:y:2013:i:3:p:445-450
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2013.02.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Goodhart,Charles, 2011. "The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107007239, November.
    2. Calomiris, Charles W. & Herring, Richard J., 2011. "Why and How to Design a Contingent Convetible Debt Requirement," Working Papers 11-41, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
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    4. Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, 2013. "The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9929, December.
    5. Martin Hellwig, 1995. "Systemic Aspects of Risk Management in Banking and Finance," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 131(IV), pages 723-737, December.
    6. Martin Hellwig, 2010. "Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(02), pages 40-46, July.
    7. repec:ces:ifodic:v:8:y:2010:i:2:p:14566986 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. David Miles & Jing Yang & Gilberto Marcheggiano, 2013. "Optimal Bank Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(567), pages 1-37, March.
    9. Martin Hellwig, 2010. "Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(2), pages 40-46, 07.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. J Doyne Farmer & Alissa M Kleinnijenhuis & Paul Nahai-Williamson & Thom Wetzer, 2020. "Foundations of system-wide financial stress testing with heterogeneous institutions," Bank of England working papers 861, Bank of England.
    2. Shaofang Li, 2021. "Quality of Bank Capital, Competition, and Risk-Taking: Some International Evidence," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(12), pages 3455-3488, September.
    3. Louhichi, Awatef & Boujelbene, Younes, 2017. "Bank capital, lending and financing behaviour of dual banking systems," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 61-79.
    4. Košak, Marko & Li, Shaofang & Lončarski, Igor & Marinč, Matej, 2015. "Quality of bank capital and bank lending behavior during the global financial crisis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 168-183.
    5. Wiersema, Garbrand & Kleinnijenhuis, Alissa M. & Wetzer, Thom & Farmer, J. Doyne, 2023. "Scenario-free analysis of financial stability with interacting contagion channels," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    6. Christina Bui, 2018. "Bank Regulation and Financial Stability," PhD Thesis, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 5-2018, January-A.
    7. Li, Boyao, 2017. "The impact of the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio on macroeconomic stability: An agent-based approach," Economics Discussion Papers 2017-2, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    8. Loizos, Konstantinos & Panagopoulos, Yannis, 2024. "Testing how banks generate credit in the USA under the Basel III framework," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 96(PA).
    9. Bui, Christina & Scheule, Harald & Wu, Eliza, 2017. "The value of bank capital buffers in maintaining financial system resilience," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 23-40.
    10. Micossi,Stefano, 2013. "A Viable Alternative to Basel III Prudential Capital Rules," CEPS Papers 8075, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    11. Matej Marinč & Mojmir Mrak & Vasja Rant, 2014. "Dimensions of Bank Capital Regulation: A Cross-Country Analysis," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 61(4), pages 415-439, September.
    12. Chernykh, Lucy & Cole, Rebel A., 2015. "How should we measure bank capital adequacy for triggering Prompt Corrective Action? A (simple) proposal," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 131-143.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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