Governance and bank characteristics in the credit and sovereign debt crises – the impact of CEO power11We are grateful to the Editor, Prof. Iftekhar Hasan and three anonymous referees for valuable comments. We acknowledge financial support from Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius Stiftelse, Handelsbanken, Sweden (Project ID: P2010-0144: 1). We are especially grateful to Hafiz Hoque for his valuable comments on an early draft of the study in which he also was a co-author. The paper has undergone major changes since then and Hafiz Hoque chose not to be a co-author of this draft. We are also thankful to Omar Sikder, Alovaddin Kalonov, Sharifur Rahman, Iffat Ara, Rokonuzzaman, and other research assistants for their help in data collection. The authors are responsible for any remaining errors

The global financial sector recently suffered from two interrelated crises: the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. A common question is whether the recent experience with the credit crisis has helped in dealing with the sovereign debt crisis. We study more specifically whether banks with powerful CEOs perform better or worse than other banks, and if there is any difference in this relationship between the two crises. Using unique hand-collected data for 378 large global banks, we find that CEO power has a significant positive relation to bank profitability and asset quality, but also to insolvency risk, during the sovereign debt crisis. Thus, strong CEOs do not appear to be detrimental to bank performance. Our results also support the idea that deposit insurance may have contributed to the credit crisis.